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MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT: STRICT CRIMINAL




You operate an electrical utility in remote, treeless areas of the American
Southwest. Migratory birds find your electrical distribution poles convenient
surrogates for trees. Unfortunately, 38 of the birds manage to electrocute them-
selves over the course of two and one-half years. You are convicted of a federal
crime, violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA),' on account of the
birds' deaths.-
Over 5000 migratory birds are found dead at the base of your radio trans-
mission towers in the middle of the Great Plains. The birds were attracted by
lights on the towers. The birds died when they collided with the towers and
tower guy wires which were obscured by fog and blowing snow.' You are not
prosecuted, and some courts have expressed misgivings about any effort being
made to prosecute you.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to protect
and preserve populations of migratory birds.' No migratory bird may be killed
Trial Attorney, Environmental Crimes Section, Environment and Natural Resources
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
The author thanks John T. Webb, Assistant Chief of the Wildlife and Marine Resources
Section, whose advice, encouragement, guidance, and wisdom made this article possible; Elinor
Colbourn, Senior Trial Attorney of the Wildlife and Marine Resources Section, whose review made
this article more accurate and readable, and assured the parallel construction of compound
statements including this one; and Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Migratory Bird Management, whose guidance to sources of data
also made this article possible. Any lingering deficiencies are entirely the responsibility of the
author.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the
views of the Department of Justice or of any other agency.
I. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See also Migratory Bird Conservation
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 7150) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining "migratory birds" for the MBTA); 50
C.F.R. § 10.13 (2000) (listing all species of migratory birds protected by the MBTA).
2. This situation arose in the case of the Moon Lake Electrical Association in Colorado. See
United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1071 (D. Colo. 1999).
3. The described incident actually occurred on the night of January 22, 1998. See THE
TOPEKA CAPITAL JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 1998), (revisited on Feb. 13, 2001)
<http://www.cjponline.constories/013098/kanbirds.html>.
4. For a discussion of the origins of the MBTA and a detailed description of its requirements,
see Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
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unless authorized by the Secretary of the Interior.' Violations of the MBTA are
criminal offenses;' most are strict liability misdemeanors.'
Pursuant to the MBTA, millions of migratory birds are lawfully killed annu-
ally by hunters' pursuant to regulations or permits issued by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).' However, it is estimated that hundreds of
millions of additional migratory birds are killed annually, without any legal
authority.'" Some of the causes of such deaths have been prosecuted, e.g., deaths
caused by illegal hunting, by ingestion of pesticides or poisons," and by electro-
cution. However, other, more destructive causes of migratory bird deaths have
not been prosecuted, e.g., deaths caused by impacts with automobiles, airplanes,
and towers. Some courts have even suggested that prosecution of such killings
may not be brought under the MBTA.'2
After a brief summary, in Part II, of the consistent judicial interpretation of
the MBTA as a strict liability criminal statute, Part III discusses the meaning of
strict criminal liability, and the ambiguities inherent in use of it or other conclu-
sory terms to describe the scienter requirements of any criminal statute.
Enforcement In Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENY. U. L. REV., 361,
361-79 (Parts I and II) (2000).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). Sections 704 and 712 of the MBTA authorize the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate regulations to implement the MBTA and its underlying conventions.
6. See id. § 707. As one federal judge stated, "My experience at the bar was that one jail
sentence was worth 100 consent decrees and that fines are meaningless because the defendant in the
end is always reimbursed by the proceeds of his wrongdoing or by his company down the line."
Steven Zipperman, Comment, The Park Doctrine - Application of Strict Criminal Liability to
Corporate Individuals For Violation of Environmental Crimes, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
123, 153 (1991) (citing Barry C. Groveman & John L. Segal, Pollution Police Pursue Chemical
Criminals, 55 Bus. Soc'Y REV. 39, 42 (1985)).
7. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) & (c). Commercial violations and certain baiting violations are not
strict liability offenses. See id. §§ 704(b) (baiting violations), 707(b) (commercial transactions). For
cases holding the MBTA is a strict liability statute, see infra Part II (MBTA Misdemeanor's Held to
Be Strict Liability Crimes).
8. Hunters killed an estimated 16.57 million ducks. 3.13 million geese, and 369,000 coots
during the 1998 waterfowl season. ELWOOD M. MARTIN & PAUL I. PADDING, U. S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV., OFFICE OF MIGRATORY BIRD MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, Harvest
Surveys Section (July, 1999). Ducks, geese, and coots are only some of the birds legally killed
pursuant to permits. Those numbers reported by Martin and Padding are comparable to data reported
by Banks for the late 1960s and early 1970s, at which time he estimated that hunting accounted for
about 60 percent of total migratory bird mortality, while impacts with human constructions
accounted for approximately 31.6 percent, and poison or pollution accounted for only 1.8 percent.
See RICHARD. C. BANKS, HUMAN RELATED MORTALITY OF BIRDS IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC REPORT-WILDLIFE 215, 14, tbl. 10 (1979)
(120,539,500 birds taken by hunting out of a total of 196,887,810 human caused fatalities). In light
of more recent estimates of non-hunting bird fatalities, it appears the number of non-hunting
fatalities is much higher and, consequently, a larger percentage of the total number of migratory bird
deaths are caused by humans. See infra Part VII.A (Foreseeable bird deaths).
9. See Migratory Bird Hunting regulations, 50 C.F.R. Part 20 (2000). See also Migratory
Bird Permits, 50 C.F.R. Part 21 (2000).
10. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 5; infra Part VII.A (Foreseeable bird deaths).
11. See, e.g., infra Part V (Judicial Uneasiness With Strict Criminal Liability). See also
Corcoran & Colboum, supra note 4, at 389-391 (Part III.B.1.).
12. See, e.g., infra Part V (Judicial Uneasiness With Strict Criminal Liability).
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Part IV describes judicial acceptance of strict criminal liability, especially by
the United States Supreme Court, even for felonies and even in its strictest form,
that in which the defendant neither knows of nor intends the circumstances
which make him or her criminally liable.
Part V describes the uneasiness often expressed when courts are called upon
to enforce strict criminal liability, while Part VI describes various means courts
have used to limit and ameliorate its effects. Part VI also discusses the limita-
tions and deficiencies in the theories and defenses used by courts to limit strict
criminal liability, including the theory of proximate causation put forward by
recent court opinions. The theories generally incorporate requirements of fore-
seeability, avoidability, and voluntary assumption of risks.
Part VII presents data which demonstrates that the circumstances in which
courts have expressed reluctance to apply strict criminal liability under the
MBTA (e.g., impacts with automobiles, aircraft, and fixed objects) are more
foreseeable and avoidable than are many other forms of indirect migratory birds
deaths caused by humans for which courts have imposed MBTA liability (e.g.,
electrocution and poisoning by pesticides).'
Part VIII describes ongoing administrative initiatives under the authority of
the MBTA to reduce foreseeable and avoidable deaths of migratory birds caused
by impacts with human constructions.
The data and analysis in this article lead to a conclusion that the courts'
efforts to limit strict liability, including the suggested use of proximate causa-
tion, is misguided policy-making that is based upon erroneous factual assump-
tions and that is better left to the democratic processes of legislation and regula-
tion.
13. Birds are killed by other non-hunting trauma, including logging and farming. This article
focuses on traumatic bird deaths for which data exists that can be compared with courts' expressions
of concern about MiBTA application. However, there is no reason to believe that, were data
available, the conclusions of this article would not be equally applicable to other common sources of
traumatic bird deaths. For a discussion of issues relating to bird deaths caused by timber harvesting,
see Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 4 at 319-393 (Part III.B.2 and 3).
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II. MBTA MISDEMEANORS HELD TO BE STRICT LIABILITY CRIMES"
That the MBTA imposes strict criminal liability was first affirmed in 1939,
in United States v. Reese."
There appears no sound basis here for an interpretation that the Con-
gress intended to place upon the Government the extreme difficulty of
proving guilty knowledge ... on the part of persons violating the ex-
press language of the applicable regulations promulgated pursuant to
the statute [MBTA]; but it is more reasonable to presume that Congress
intended to require that hunters shall investigate at their peril conditions
surrounding the fields in which they seek their quarry."
Since 1939, the federal courts of appeal have almost uniformly held the
misdemeanor provision of the MBTA, Section 707(a), to be a strict liability
criminal statute.'7
14. For policy arguments for and against strict liability under the MBTA, compare Steven
Margolin, Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 989, 996-999 (1979)
(advocating strict liability), with M. Lanier Woodrum, The Courts Take Flight: Scienter and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241, 243-48 (1979) (opposing a strict liability
interpretation). Woodrum's premise, that Congress did not intend the MBTA to be a strict liability
crime, has since been disproved by Congress in its statements in connection with amendments to the
felony and the baiting provisions of the MBTA. See S. REP. No. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128 ("Nothing in this amendment [to the felony provision) is intended to
alter the 'strict liability' standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard
which has been upheld in many Federal court decisions."); S. REP. No. 105-366, at 1-2 (1998)
("General Statement and Background") (when Congress added the scienter requirement for MBTA
felony offenses it "expressly reinforced the strict liability standard for misdemeanors ...."); S. REP.
No. 105-366, at 2-3 (1998) ("Summary and Objectives of the Legislation") ("The elimination of
strict liability, however, applies only to hunting with bait or over baited areas, and is not intended in
any way to reflect upon the general application of strict liability under the MBTA."). Nevertheless,
the force of the policy arguments against imposing strict liability remain.
15. 27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
16. Reese, 27 F. Supp. at 835.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Scienter is not an element of criminal liability under the
Act's misdemeanor provisions."); United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 n.4 (8' Cir. 1986)
("[Ilit is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific
intent or guilty knowledge."); United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[A]
hunter is strictly liable for shooting on or over a baited area."); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d
1102, 1104-05 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that scienter is not a required element for a conviction under
the MBTA). Limited exceptions to the uniform affirmation of strict criminal liability under the
MBTA were the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the original MBTA strict liability felony provision and
the Fifth Circuit's rejection of strict liability for hunting over or with the aid of bait. See United
States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910,
912-13 (5th Cir. 1978). Although no other Circuit joined the Sixth or Fifth Circuits, in each instance
Congress amended the MBTA to require scienter. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 704(b) (2000) (baiting
provisions); 16 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (felony provision) (2000).
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11. MEANING OF STRICT LIABILITY
A. Classic Description of Strict Liability
"Ordinarily, a criminal offense requires both a voluntary act (actus
reus) and a culpable state of mind (mens rea).' '
The Supreme Court has observed that "[tihe existence of a mens rea is the
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence.""
However, for some crimes a culpable mental state, or mens rea, is not re-
quired for a conviction. One category of such crimes is known under the name
of "strict liability." Examples of strict liability crimes include sales of alcohol to
vulnerable groups, sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, narcotics trans-
actions, and child pornography.' In recent years, the list has expanded to include
reporting violations."
18. Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1993) (citing Gerhard O.W. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42
MINN. L. REV. 1043, 1052 (1958)). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52
(1952) ("Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-
meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and
early root in American soil."). But see Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) ("[T]he
background presumption that every citizen knows the law makes it unnecessary to adduce specific
evidence to prove that 'an evil-meaning mind' directed the 'evil-doing hand."'). "Primitive English
law 'started from a basis bordering on absolute liability.'" Dennis Jenkins, Criminal Prosecution and
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: An Analysis of the Constitution and Criminal Intent in an
Environmental Context, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 595, 596 n.5 (1997) (quoting Francis B.
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977 (1932)). The need for an actus reas has a
Constitutional foundation in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 533 (1968) ("[C]riminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some
act .... has committed some actus reas") (interpreting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
19. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500
(1951))).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
Morissette 342 U.S. at 250. See also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)
("[Climinal offenses requiring no mens tea have a 'generally disfavored status."') (quoting United
States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438).
20. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 406, n.29. Much of Levenson's footnote is derived from a
1933 list of strict liability public welfare offenses by Francis B. Sayre. See id. supra note 18, at 406,
n.29 (citing Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73 (1933)). See also
Robert J. Jossen, Strict Liability in Criminal Cases-The Present Day Implications of Dotterweich
and Park, in CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS 1985, at 33, 39-40 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. C4-4174, Dec. 16, 1985) (citing other examples of strict
liability crimes including transportation of dangerous products, dumping of hazardous wastes,
fishing in international waters, Occupational Health and Safety Act violations).
21. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 413 n.76 (citing the Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1984, 7
U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. 11 1990) (imposing imprisonment up to five years for failure to comply with
tobacco manufacturer's reporting requirements)). It has been said that felony murder is a form of
strict criminal liability in that criminal liability is imposed regardless of whether or not deaths were a
1999]
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Strict criminal liability means criminal prosecution without proof of mens
rea, without proof of guilty knowledge or of evil or wrongful purpose-the de-
fendant may not even know the facts that subject him or her to criminal
liability." Strict criminal liability has also been described as a no-fault crime,
allowing conviction without proof of any fault on the part of the defendant.23 In
this sense, strict liability is absolute liability."s Absolute criminal liability can
convict the morally blameless or "innocent"" and, perhaps, has been best de-
scribed by the statement that, "If a principle is at work here, it is the principle of
'tough luck."'..
B. Ambiguities In Strict Criminal Liability Overlap with Other Mens Rea
A more accurate description of strict criminal liability is that it removes the
requirement of proof of the defendant's knowledge of one or more key or "mate
foreseeable consequence of the illegal crimes being committed. Levenson, supra note 18, at 423
n.113; id. at 425 n.125.
22. See also Zipperman, supra note 5, at 127 (strict criminal liability can hold one "liable,
although he is not only not charged with moral wrongdoing, but has not even departed in any way
from a reasonable standard of intent or care.") (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 536 (5th ed. 1984)). See, e.g.,United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250,
252-53 (1922); Jossen, supra note 20, at 35.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 610 (1971) (quoting Balint, 342 U.S. at
254) (explaining that strict liability may expose those who are "innocent" actors to a criminal
penalty).
24. See United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 660 (5th Cir. 1976); Levenson, supra
note 18, at 417. "Absolute liability" means criminal liability without regard to the defendant's
knowledge or intentions and may be a technically accurate description of a strict liability crime, but
it probably is generally not an accurate description of what a prosecutor is willing to prosecute. See
id. at 417 n.86 (suggesting "absolute liability", more precisely describes situations in commonwealth
countries in which Parliament expressly states that no mens rea is required and that no defense based
on mens rea will be permitted) (citing C.B. Cato, Strict Liability and the Half-Way House, 1981 N.Z.
L.J. 294, 294 n.6 (1981)). But see Levenson, supra note 18, at 415 ("The prosecution proposed to
hold Keating 'responsible for an offense which, no matter how careful, no matter how honest, no
matter how decent and law abiding he may be, he could not by the most diligent effort know
about."') (quoting prosecution argument in Respondent's Brief at 18-20, People v. Keating, No. BA
025236 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991)). Strict liability in tort is rarely absolute. See KEETON, supra note 22,
§ 79, at 559-60.
25. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 413 (listing convictions of persons without knowledge of
their own wrongdoing, including a widow convicted of adultery after being erroneously informed
that her husband was dead, Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889), and also a farmer convicted of
trespass after relying on faulty government survey report, State v. Gould, 40 Iowa 372 (1875)). See
generally KEETON, supra note 22, § 75, at 535 (distinguishing the criminal law "fault" connotation
of moral blame from tort law "fault" which means only a departure from a required standard of
conduct even if innocent or beyond defendant's control).
26. Stanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 267 (1987). See also Mark
Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST. 1512, 1515
(Standford H. Kadish ed., 1983) ("[T]here is no reason to believe that he is anything worse than
unlucky, and no reason to single him out for disapproval.").
[Vol. 77:2
MIGRATORY BIRD TREATYACT
rial" elements of the crime." The requirement for some knowledge distinguishes
strict liability from absolute liability. Strict liability crimes are also kin to the
related doctrines of vicarious criminal liability"8 and responsible corporate offi-
cer"9 which can impose a duty to ascertain relevant facts and to undertake action
to prevent violations.'
Strict criminal liability is similar to negligent crimes in that negligent crimes
do not require any particular state of mind on the part of the defendant" but,
27. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 418 n.90 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(4), 2.05
(1962)). In the course of rejecting a strict criminal liability interpretation of the National Firearms
Act 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994), the Supreme Court stated that "the term 'strict liability' is really
a misnomer," and that, in interpreting public welfare offenses, it has generally "avoided construing
criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict liability." Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
607 n.3 (1994). In Staples, the Court stated expressly that "different elements of the same offense
can require different mental states." Id. at 609. Courts have also interpreted a strict criminal liability
provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1994), to
include a knowledge component. See Zipperman, supra note 5, at 159 n.257. Strict liability in tort
also requires some amount of knowledge. Prosser and Keeton observe that, absent a contrary
statutory provision:
[Sitrict liability will never be found unless the defendant is aware of the
abnormally dangerous condition or activity, and has voluntarily engaged in or
permitted it. Mere negligent failure to discover or prevent it is not enough,
although it may, of course, be an independent basis of liability . . . . What is
meant is that he is liable although (I) he did not intend an invasion on the basis of
which liability could be imposed and (2) he was not negligent in proximately
causing the harm.
27. KEETON, supra note 22. § 79, at 559 (footnote omitted).
28. See KEETON, supra note 22, § 81, at 582 (stating that "[v]icarious liability is now quite
generally recognized as a form of strict liability" in torts.) (footnote omitted); Levenson, supra note
18, at 417 n.86 ("Vicarious liability refers to a respondeat superior notion that a supervising
individual or corporation may be criminally liable for another's act without knowledge of the
wrongful conduct of the responsible party.") (citations omitted).
29. See Avo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d at 661-62 (relying on responsible corporate officer analysis in
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676 (1975)).
30. See infra notes 53-57 and 66-67, and accompanying text (discussing Unites States v. Park,
421 U.S. 658 (1975), and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
31. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 420 n.98. The negligent defendant may be totally unaware
of risks created by his or her activities, but the law holds him or her responsible for his or her
disregard of the rights of and risks to others. See Levenson, supra note 18. at 420 n.97.
Again where one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to
them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the policy of the law may, in order to
stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he
be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells.
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (affirming
strict criminal liability for narcotics sale). In terms of the defendant's lack of knowledge, the
negligence described by the Balint court is indistinguishable from a strict liability crime, but the
burden of proof and the defenses available differ for strict criminal liability and for negligent crimes.
"Park established that the failure of a manager to act, when he or she had the authority and
responsibility to act, will result in a violation. This description of duty and breach invites a standard
negligence analysis." Zipperman, supra note 5, at 132 (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 671). Still, "[tihe
Park doctrine contains an inherent ambiguity as to whether a corporate officer is strictly liable
merely because he or she possesses the power to correct a violation, or whether the prosecution must
show the violation of a negligence standard." Zipperman, supra note 5, at 133.
"Thus, any differences between the theories of negligence and strict liability are
insignificant in practice." Id. at 134. "In practice, negligence statutes frequently become the
1999]
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rather, only require a failure to meet a standard of conduct that is expected of the
defendant regardless of his or her state of mind."
In the end, the phrase "strict liability" is misleading and overused. Descrip-
tive phrases such as "absolute liability," "strict liability," "negligence," "know-
ingly," "general intent," "wilfully" and "specific intent" give a mistaken impres-
sion that there are discrete levels of mens rea or criminal intent, analogous to
physical quantum states, into which any given crime may be placed without
overlapping adjacent, but separate, levels of mens rea. Instead, different levels
of criminal mens rea are more numerous and, in practice, tend to merge into a
continuum of mental states." On one end of the continuum are crimes for which
the prosecution must prove the defendant acted with knowledge that the results
were prohibited by a statute of which the defendant knew and which he or she
intended to violate.' At the other end of the continuum are crimes, much more
common in theory than in practice, for which the defendant need only be proven
to have caused a prohibited result, regardless of the defendant's knowledge,
intention, ability to avoid the result, or even extraordinary efforts to prevent and
avoid the result.
An example of the overlap in terminology, and consequential ambiguities, is
in the use of "knowingly" and "willfully" to describe mens rea.3 In different
contexts, "willfully" means anything from an act simply done "voluntarily and
intentionally" without any bad purpose or knowledge of illegality," to an act
functional equivalent of strict liability statutes. When the public welfare is at stake, courts often
apply strict liability, but call it negligence." Zipperman, supra note 5, at 148.
32. One authority has stated that the difference between strict criminal liability and negligent
crimes "is that, as long as the crime is a non-strict liability crime [i.e., negligence], the issue is
decided by a tribunal which both hears the evidence and sets the standard [of conduct] in the
defendant's case." Levenson, supra note 18, at 420 n.102 (quoting Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal
Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L.
REV. 1571, 1584 (1978)). Apparently, the Supreme Court agrees. See United States v. Morissette,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a
guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction . . . and to circumscribe the freedom
heretofore allowed juries.").
33. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 432 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (describing a
"continuum of strict liability crimes"). The United States Sentencing Guidelines describe a portion
of the continuum in the policy statement on regulatory offenses which describes four categories of
technical recordkeeping offenses: failure to fill out a form intentionally but without knowledge or
intent that substantive harm result; the same failure may carry a substantial likelihood of harm or
make the harm more likely; the failure may have actually led to substantive harm; and the failure
may have been intended to conceal harm that had occurred. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1A4(f) (1999).
34. See generally United States v. Moskowitz, 883 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
that a willful violation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(h)(2),
required both knowing acts (voluntary and intentional and not accidental), and knowledge that the
regulations prohibited the acts).
35. "Much confusion exists over the precise meaning of mens rea today because 'not all
lawyers and judges assign the term . . . a normative meaning."' Jenkins, supra note 18, at 596 n.8
(citing Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The
Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1167 n.10 (1995)).
36. 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.02 cmt. (1996); 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt.
(1997) ("willfulness" as a description of an "intentional mental state" connotes an act "done on
purpose; it does not suggest the act was committed for a particular purpose, evil in nature") (quoting
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done with knowledge of wrongfulness but not of illegality," to an act done "vol-
untarily and intentionally with the purpose of violating a known legal duty," as
in tax cases,' or even an act done knowing the actions were illegal." Similarly,
"knowingly" means anything from an act done without any bad purpose or
knowledge of illegality,"° to a possessory act done with knowledge of the nature
of the material possessed (e.g., the age of persons depicted in sexually explicit
material) but not necessarily knowledge of its illegality," to an act done knowing
it was forbidden by law, albeit the defendant may not have known the particular
law." The Ninth Circuit has observed that "the difference [between willfully and
knowingly] appears to be more one of semantics than actual substance."'" Simi-
larly, courts use the term "strict liability" to describe a continuum of mental
states also described by the terms "absolute liability," "negligence,"- and
"knowingly.""
Appellate courts' pattern jury instructions discourage use of ambiguous
terminology such as "general intent," "specific intent," and "willfully."' Prop-
erly, a court should focus on the mens rea required for each individual element
of the offense." Nevertheless, courts continue to characterize statutes as a whole.
Consequently, the degree of concern that a court may show for the imposition of
S. REP. No. 95-605, at 58-59 (1977)). See also 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt. (1997) ("In
many cases.... the concept of willfulness will be adequately explained in other instructions defining
'knowingly,' 'intentionally,' or 'deliberately."'). "The word 'willful,' even in criminal statutes,
means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing. It does not mean
that, in addition, he must suppose that he is breaking the law." 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt.
(1997) (quoting Judge Learned Hand in American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605. 606 (2nd Cir.
1925)).
37. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1998) (proof of knowledge of the
law is not required because of the "background presumption that every citizen knows the law").
38. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.02 cmt. (1996); 9th Cir. Crim. Jury Instr. 5.5 cmt.
(1997).
39. See 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt. (1997) (in context of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994)).
40. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.03 cmt. (1996); 9th Cir. Crim. Jury Instr. 5.6 cmt.
(1997).
41. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.03 cmt. (1996) (citing United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)).
42. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.03 cmt. (1996) (citing Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 434 (1985)).
43. See 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt. (1997) (quoting United States v. Sirhan, 504
F.2d 818, 820 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974)).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
45. Courts uncomfortable with strict liability often adopt defenses and burdens of presenting
evidence normally applicable to negligent crimes. See infra Part VI (Defenses, Limitations, and
Ameliorations to Strict Liability).
46. 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.4 cmt. (1997) ("recommends avoiding instructions that
distinguish between 'specific intent' and 'general intent'"); id. at 5.5 (recommends no instruction
defining willfully); id. at 5.6 (instruction may be appropriate but it is reversible error to give
knowingly instruction in money laundering cases); 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.01 cmt. (1996) (no
specific intent instruction recommended), id. at 7.02 (no willfully instruction recommended except
in tax cases and odometer fraud cases), id. at 7.03 (no knowingly instruction recommended).
47. See, e.g., 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.4 cmt. (1997) ("Accordingly, the judge should
determine the requisite mental state as to each element of the charged offense and instruct thereon.");
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994) (public welfare offenses eliminate the
requirement of mens rea with respect to an element of a crime).
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strict criminal liability depends on what form of "strict liability" it is imposing
from the outset.
IV. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Strict criminal liability has been upheld by courts,' including the United
States Supreme Court, in even its strictest forms. Although the Supreme Court
has described strict criminal liability as "generally disfavored,'"' it does not "in-
variably offend constitutional requirements.""0
The Supreme Court has endorsed the application of strict criminal liability in
which absolutely no mens rea was required," i.e., absolute liability. At other
times the Supreme Court has affirmed criminal liability under statutes that
omitted the mens rea requirement for one or more elements of the offense but
not for all the elements. It described some of those cases as "strict liability"
offenses and others as "knowing" offenses but the results were similar for the
defendants. The point of these cases is that Congress may Constitutionally omit
the requirement for mens rea from criminal statutes, regardless of whether the
offenses are or are not characterized as "strict liability" crimes. Cases in which
the Supreme Court has upheld the omission of mens rea from criminal statutes
include the following:"2
United States v. Park,5" reinstated a misdemeanor" conviction of a "re-
sponsible corporate officer" for adulterated food stored in a contami-
nated warehouse. Although there was evidence that the defendant knew
of the problem, the Supreme Court stated, without reservations, that the
Act did not condition criminal liability upon the defendant's "aware-
ness of some wrongdoing" or "conscious fraud."5 The defendant need
only have been in a position with responsibility and authority to pre-
48. See, e.g., United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 435-36 (3d. Cir. 1986). See also supra Part H (MBTA Misdemeanors
Held To Be Strict Liability Crimes).
49. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978).
50. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
52. Except as otherwise noted, the maximum penalties described for the listed Supreme Court
cases are taken from Engler, 806 F.2d at 435.
53. 421 U.S. 658 (1975). One commentator has argued that reliance on Park or Dotterweich,
in the context of strict liability, as opposed to vicarious liability crimes, is misplaced since the
question involved in those cases was extension of existing strict liability under the FDCA rather than
the initial imposition of strict liability. See Woodrum, supra note 14, at 249 n.81 (describing Park
and Dotterwiech as cases of vicarious liability in which the liability happened to be strict liability).
However, one can also argue that, instead of being held vicariously liable for the violations of their
subordinates, the corporate officers were being held strictly liable for failing to perform a statutory
duty of their own, such as to prevent the violations. See Zipperman, supra note 6, at 129.
54. The maximum possible imprisonment for a federal misdemeanor conviction is one year,
and it may be less. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6)-(8) (1994) (classification of misdemeanor offenses);
id. § 358 l(b)(6)-(8) (maximum terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors).
55. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975) (citing United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
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vent or correct the violation and failed to do so." The statute imposed
"a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations . . . [and] a duty to
implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.""
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.," reinstated
an information which failed to charge a "'knowing violation' of the
regulation.... that required hazardous materials to be listed on shipping
papers. Relying on Balint and Freed, the Court stated that the probabil-
ity of regulations is so great that anyone aware of his or her possession
of hazardous materials "must be presumed to be aware of the regula-
tion.""' The Court also held that the defendant would not be guilty if, in
good faith, the defendant thought it was shipping an innocuous sub-
stance such as distilled water."'
United States v. Freed," reinstated an indictment, charging possession
of an unregistered destructive device, specifically hand grenades, that
had no allegation that the defendant knew them to be unregistered."
The maximum penalty was $10,000, ten years in prison, or both.
United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Company,' reinstated an infor-
mation charging the defendant with holding food under unsanitary con-
ditions, the court observing that "[iut is settled law in the area of food
and drug regulation that a guilty intent is not always a prerequisite to
the imposition of criminal sanctions."
56. See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74. Park specified two requirements for criminal
responsibility of persons not directly responsible for the criminal act: (1) the superior must occupy a
position of "responsibility and authority" with regard to the act, and (2) must have had the power to
prevent it through the exercise of the "highest standard of foresight and vigilance." Developments in
the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 1243, 1262-63 (1979) (quoting Park, 421 U.S. at 672-674).
57. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
58. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
59. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559.
60. Id. at 565. The Supreme Court also recited the maxim that "ignorance of the law is no
excuse." Id. at 562. The Supreme Court does not explain why, if ignorance of the law is truly no
excuse, there is any need for a presumption of knowledge of regulations based on the knowing
possession of "dangerous or deleterious devices or products ...." Id. at 565. Cf. Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (finding a due process notice requirement is a precondition
"where a person, wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of justice for
condemnation in a criminal case."). International Minerals illustrates the converse of the paradox
described by Jenkins: "Although the criminal law generally sought to punish only the morally
blameworthy, the law, in a confusing and ill-defined paradox, also generally held that ignorance of
the law was no excuse from criminal liability." Jenkins, supra note 18, at 597.
61. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563-64. Although the Court expressly distinguished
International Minerals and Freed from strict liability offenses, both the International Minerals and
Freed decisions presumed knowledge of regulations, based upon the defendant's knowledge of the
nature of the items possessed, and dispensed with any requirement to prove the defendant acted with
a bad or guilty intent.
62. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
63. Only the manufacturer or importer could register. Freed, 401 U.S. at 603-604.
64. 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964). The issue in Wiesenfeld Warehouse was whether the statute was
vague and whether the District Court had correctly interpreted the statute. See id at 89-91.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's discussion of the requisite intent was dicta.
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Williams v. North Carolina,' affirmed a conviction for bigamy, with no
proof that the defendants knew that North Carolina would not recog-
nize their Nebraska divorces. The maximum penalty was ten years in
prison.
United States v. Dotterweich," reinstated a misdemeanor conviction for
misbranded and adulterated drugs. The defendant's mens rea was not
an issue in the Supreme Court but the Court described the statute under
which he was convicted as being of a type that "dispenses with the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct--awareness of some
wrongdoing."6'
United States v. Balint," reinstated an indictment, charging selling of a
derivative of opium, that had no allegation that the defendant knew it to
be a prohibited drug. The maximum penalty was five years in prison.
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. v. United States,' affirmed a pen-
alty for failure to properly maintain rail car couplers and brakes, even
though the defendant exercised reasonable care, had no knowledge the
cars were out of repair, and had no intention to violate the law.7' Al-
though the case was a civil proceeding, the reasoning of the Supreme
Court did not distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings."
Shevlin-Carpenter Company v. Minnesota," affirmed a conviction for
trespass, in the form of timber cutting, even though the defendant "had
reasonable ground for believing authority had been granted, and hon-
estly acted on such belief."" The penalty for the corporate defendant
65. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
66. 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see also supra note 53 (discussing whether Park and Dotterweich are
appropriate precedents for interpreting strict criminal liability).
67. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
68. 258 U.S. 250 (1922). See also United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922)
(reinstating indictment for unlawful selling of narcotics by a physician writing prescriptions; "If the
offense be a statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need
not charge such knowledge or intent.").
69. 220 U.S. 559 (1911).
70. See id. at 569.
71. "The power of the legislature to declare an offense, and to exclude the elements of
knowledge and due diligence from any inquiry as to its commission, cannot, we think, be
questioned." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 220 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted). See also id. at
579.
72. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
73. Shelvin-Carpenter, 218 U.S. at 64 (quoting State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 102 Minn. 470,
479, 113 N.W. 634, 638 (1907)). In Shevlin-Carpenter, the Supreme Court articulated a conclusive
argument that "innocence cannot be asserted of an action which violates existing law, and ignorance
of the law will not excuse." Id. at 68. The problem in the Shevlin-Carpenter reasoning is that the
defendant was reasonably mistaken as to the factual status of his permit, not the legal consequences
of those facts. The Court did not rely on the reasoning of Shevlin-Carpenter in its Balint decision, in
which it described potential "innocent" sellers of drugs, something impossible under the Shevlin-
Carpenter reasoning that there can be no "innocent" law-breakers. See Balint, 258 U.S. at 254
(describing potential "innocent" sellers of drugs).
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was double damages in the amount of $14,664.12" but the penalty for
an individual could include up to two years in prison.'
Certain themes, not always consistent, can be derived from the Supreme
Court cases. The offenses were often labeled as public welfare, safety, or morals
statutes." The Court was usually but not always of the opinion that the affected
public either should have been aware that there would be laws or regulations
that should be consulted," or had knowingly assumed a risk." The Court has
Note however that, today, environmental and wildlife permits are treated as an extension
of regulatory law and, as such, their interpretation are matters of law and not of fact. See, e.g.,
United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1287 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. Shelvin-Carpenter, 218 U.S. at 64.
75. See id. at 62 n.I.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (public safety); Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238 (1945) ("public policy ... bearing upon the integrity of family
life ...."); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) ("phases of the lives and health
of people which ... are largely beyond self-protection"); Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53 ("maintenance
of a public policy" by police power to control a "noxious" substance); Shevlin-Carpenter, 218 U.S.
at 68 ("the public welfare has made it necessary to declare a crime"). See also Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994) (describing "public welfare offenses"); United States v. Ayo-
Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 660 (5th Cir. 1976) ("the Act is based on strong policy considerations").
77. See, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565
(1971) ("[A]nyone who is aware that he is in possession of [dangerous materials] ...must be
presumed to be aware of the regulation."); Freed, 401 U.S. at 609 ("[Olne would hardly be surprised
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act."). See also Balint, 258 U.S. at 254
("Doubtless considerations as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact" were included by
Congress in its calculus in electing strict criminal liability); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425,
435-36 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The capture and sale of species protected by the MBTA is not 'conduct that
is wholly passive,' but more closely resembles conduct 'that one would hardly be surprised to learn.
. .is not innocent."') (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920)); Ayo-Gonzalez, 536
F.2d at 660 ("[L]awmakers clearly thought it highly unlikely that purely innocent violations would
occur."). See also Staples, 511 U.S. at 611 (possession of guns, even though arguably "dangerous,"
would not alert owners to likelihood of strict regulation). The Supreme Court has had a similar focus
- on the likelihood that a defendant might know regulations exist - in its decisions that decline to
interpret criminal statutes as imposing strict liability. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 432-33 (1985) (distinguishing a strict liability public welfare offense as one in which "Congress
has rendered criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent
public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's health and safety"); Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 227 (1957) (finding strict criminal liability violated due process "where no
showing is made of the probability of such knowledge" that a felon must register if remaining in Los
Angeles more than five days).
Recently, two Supreme Court justices have expressed a desire to limit the application of
the public welfare doctrine to individual factual situations arising under the criminal statutes instead
of to the statutes as a whole. See Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (Justices Thomas
and O'Connor dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas authored the Staples opinion that
declined to apply the public welfare doctrine to regulation of admittedly dangerous implements, such
as guns, if the implements were in common use. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 611. Justice O'Connor
authored a concurring opinion in Sweet Home that elaborated the use of proximate causation to limit
strict criminal liability. See Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687, 708-714 (1995) (Justice O'Connor, concurring).
78. "The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are
beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has
a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises
whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them."
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975); Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-54 (defendant to act
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consistently held that Congress may balance the possible injustice of subjecting
an innocent actor to criminal liability against the evil of exposing innocent
members of the public to the danger being regulated. "In the interest of the
larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise inno-
cent but standing in responsible relationship to a public danger.'" 9 The same
rationale supports omission of a mens rea requirement in other areas of govern-
ment regulations, including environmental and wildlife regulation. '
The Supreme Court has also accepted the difficulty of proving scienter as an
appropriate consideration in the calculus by Congress." In general, the Court has
not seen the role of courts to be protection of the innocent persons swept up in
(selling) and to ascertain facts "at his peril"); Shevlin -Carpenter Co., 218 U.S. at 69 ("When the
permit was issued, plaintiffs in error knew the limitations of it, and they took it at the risk and
consequences of transgression"). The requirement that the defendant subject to strict liability
voluntarily assume a position of responsibility for a foreseeable risk is also a foundation for strict
liability in tort. See KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 559.
("It is quite conceivable that Congress, contemplating the inevitable hardship of such injuries
[caused by the prohibited conduct], and hoping to diminish the economic loss to the community
resulting from them, should deem it wise to impose their burdens upon those who could measurably
control their causes, instead of upon those who are in the main helpless in that regard.").
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) ("The accused, if he does not
will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect ... from one who assumed his responsibilities."). But see Liparota, 471 U.S. at
432-33 (describes most "public welfare offenses" as having "rendered criminal a type of conduct
that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health or safety"). The Liparota characterization may be difficult to square
with Williams, 325 U.S. at 227, 239, which upheld a felony conviction for bigamous cohabitation in
North Carolina following valid Nevada divorces.
79. United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964) (quoting Dotterweich,
320 U.S. at 281). See, e.g., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 ("Balancing relative hardships, Congress
has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the
existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce,
rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.").
Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug,
and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations as to
the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact and the difficulty of proof of knowledge contributed
to this conclusion."). See also Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry.,, 220 U.S. at 575 ("its harshness is
no concern to the courts").
Perhaps the reader's most intimate experience with strict criminal liability is with driving
faster than the speed limit, inadvertently of course, for which it is particularly apt to say that the risks
of the illegal conduct "include the possibility of physical or moral harm, and the possibility that a
culpable defendant would escape punishment by feigning ignorance or mistake." Levenson, supra
note 18, at 424.
80. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 282-83 & n.2 (in the context of drug regulation, Congress
has observed that, for regulations enforced only by fines, "[clorporations carrying on an illicit trade
would be subject only to . . .a 'license fee' for the conduct of an illegitimate business.") (citing
H.Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p.4).
81. See, e.g., Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("Doubtless considerations as to the opportunity of the
seller to find out the fact... " were weighed by Congress); Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 218 U.S. at 69
("[W]hether wilful, accidental, or involuntary [is] equally difficult to establish ...."). See also Ayo-
Gonzalez, 536 F.2d at 660 ("Moreover, it is appropriate to note that prosecutions under section 1081
would be extremely difficult if the government had to prove willfulness or even negligence.").
[Vol. 77:2
MIGRATORY BIRD TREATYACT
the net that Congress cast." Quite the contrary, the Court has emphasized the
primacy of implementing the intent of Congress."
The ripple, or perhaps the rapids, in the smooth flow of the Supreme Court's
opinions was its decision in United States v. Morissette" In Morissette, the Su-
preme Court reversed a conviction for taking $84 worth of spent shell casings
from a posted artillery range." Without contradiction, Morissette denied any
criminal intent in taking the casings, which he believed to be abandoned. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction." In a frequently quoted passage, the
Supreme Court described strict criminal liability cases as ones in which "penal-
ties commonly are relatively small,"88 a demonstratively inaccurate description
82. But see infra Part VI. (Defenses, Limitations and Ameliorations to Strict Liability).
83. See, e.g., Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53 (whether scienter is an element of a statutory criminal
offense "is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court"). See also Liparota, 471 U.S.
at 424 ("The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature,
particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.") (citing to United
States v. Hudson, II U.S. 32 (1812)); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986)
("We agree with the district court that to supply an element of specific intent here would be
impermissible 'judicial legislation."'); Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1984)
("A state's decisions regarding which actions or activities will give rise to strict criminal liability rest
within that state's sound legislative discretion."); Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d at 658 ("The question,
then, is primarily one of legislative intent, but the result must comport with fundamental
constitutional standards.").
84. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
85. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247, 276.
86. See id. at 248-49.
87. See id. at 276.
88. Id. at 256.
The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to injury
from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms . . . . Traffic of velocities,
volumes and variety unheard of came to subject the wayfarer to intolerable
casualty risks .... Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called for health
and welfare regulations .... [W]ide distribution of goods became an instrument
of wide distribution of harm . . . . Such dangers have engendered increasingly
numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of
particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health,
safety or welfare.
Id. at 253-254.
[L]awmakers, whether wisely or not, have sought to make such regulations more
effective by invoking criminal sanctions . . . aptly called 'public welfare offenses'
. . . Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or
invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of
neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many
violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or
property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to
minimize .... In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the
same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence,
legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify
intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will the violation,
usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one
who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small,
and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation.
Id. at 254-56. For examples of cases and authorities citing or quoting Morissette, see Levenson,
supra note 18, at 419 n.93; United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1985); Ayo-
Gonzalez, 536 F.2d at 657-58.
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of the Supreme Court's own affirmations of strict criminal liability in the cases
listed above." In fact, the Morissette decision turned not on the magnitude of the
criminal penalties, for Morissette was convicted of a misdemeanor violation,"
but rather on statutory interpretation." The Supreme Court treated the offense as
one based on common law antecedents, for which the Court will not dispense
with mens rea absent a clear intent by Congress to do so, rather than a public
welfare offense. 2 Thus, properly interpreted, Morissette is an expression of
courts' reluctance to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes as imposing strict
liability; it is not an expression of a limit on the power of Congress to impose
strict liability.
V. JUDICIAL UNEASINESS WITH STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The justification for strict criminal liability is that it shifts the risks of dan-
gerous activity to those best able to prevent a mishap.93 As Dean Roscoe Pound
Sometimes, the reliance on Morissette appears to be deliberately selective. For example,
the Supreme Court in Staples cited and relied upon the Morissette description of commonly small
penalities, and with citations to numerous state court cases, but ignored the many Supreme Court
affirmations of strict criminal liability, with the exception of a single "but see" citation to Balint. See
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-619 (1994).
89. See supra Part IV (Judicial Acceptance of Strict Criminal Liability). See also Levenson,
supra note 18, at 404 n.16 ("Furthermore, the Supreme Court has fostered a misperception that
culpability is irrelevant because of the absence of severe penalties."); id. at n. 17 (listing federal and
state strict criminal liability felony cases in which maximum sentences could have been as much as
five or ten years in prison for narcotics, pornography, securities fraud, bribery, bank loan, and
criminal syndicalism offenses). Furthermore, as many have observed, even a misdemeanor
conviction can have a significant effect upon one's reputation. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d
425, 434 (3rd Cir. 1986) ("The differences between the objective penalties of the misdemeanor and
felony provisions of the Act is, for due process purposes, de minimus.").
90. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248. Morissette was sentenced to two months imprisonment or
a fine of $200. Id. The maximum penalty provided by the statute was one year imprisonment or a
fine of up to $1000. See id. n.2.
91. See id. at 263-73. See also, Jenkins, supra note 18, at 620 (stating that Morissette stands
for the proposition that Congressional intent must be determined when criminal intent is omitted);
Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Morissette Court
enunciated factors as general policy concerns which explain the historical development of strict
liability crimes). Morissette established an interpretative presumption that crimes having their origin
in the common law will not be construed as eliminating the element of a mens rea absent a clear
intent by Congress to eliminate the element. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 437 (1978). See also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 265 ("[I]t is significant that we have not
found, nor has our attention been directed to, any instance in which Congress has expressly
eliminated the mental element from a crime taken over from the common law.").
92. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53 ("However, the Balint and Behrman offenses belong to
a category of another character, with very different antecedents and origins. The crimes there
involved depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions.").
93. This rationale for strict criminal liability parallels the rational for strict tort liability. The
foundation for strict liability in tort is that the defendant has possession and power to control. See
KEETON, supra note 22, at 541 (discussing strict liability for damages caused by trespassing
livestock). In the case of strict liability in tort, the public policy at play is that the person who
brought into the community an unusual, abnormal, or unnatural activity should bear the costs of
misadventure regardless of fault. See id. § 75, at 536-537.
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said: "'[Strict liability] statutes are not meant to punish the vicious will but to
put pressure upon the thoughtless and inefficient to do their whole duty in the
interest of public health or safety or morals."'" The Supreme Court has voiced a
similar rationale:
The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to
prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and
no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed
his responsibilities."
It is frequently argued, with good cause, that sweeping up the innocent' with
the guilty, as is the case for strict liability without defenses, does not serve the
objective of shifting risks to those best able to prevent mishap, nor does it serve
any other reasonable societal purpose."
Whatever value strict criminal liability may have against those with the
ability to prevent harm, there is no utility when all reasonable means and care
have been taken and the activities are commonly accepted as necessary to mod-
em society." Therefore, "[s]trict liability laws are inefficient because they tend
Strict liability in tort is essentially a cost-shifting provision that does not depend upon the
degree of care but simply on the defendant's choice to undertake the activity. See id. § 78, at 556
("The point is that certain conditions and activities may be so hazardous to another or to the public
generally and of such relative infrequent occurrence to justify allocating the risk of loss to the
enterpriser engaging in such conduct as a cost of doing business."). Thus, even in the absence of
culpability on the part of the defendant, a rational societal purpose is served. In contrast, strict
criminal liability does not shift the burden of misadventure from the victim to the initiator of the
activity. If there is also no means by which even the most careful defendant could have avoided
misadventure, then strict criminal liability serves no purpose other than to frighten citizens into
avoiding activities that are useful or even necessary to a modem society.
94. Levenson, supra note 18, at 419 n.95 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW 52 (1921)).
95. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256).
96. For examples of "innocent" defendants in strict criminal liability cases, see Levenson,
supra note 18, at 403 n.6 (citing cases concerning reliance on state licensed personnel, and long-
standing practices and directions by a supervisor in the defendant's government office). Although
beyond the scope of this article, corporate officers and supervisors without knowledge of their
subordinates' wrongdoing are not "innocent." One of the most succinct explanations for why they
are not innocent was given in an early English criminal case against corporate directors who were
ignorant of illegal disposal of waste. "'[I]f persons for their own advantage employ servants to
conduct works, they must be answerable for what is done by those servants."' Zipperman, supra note
6, at 125 (quoting Rex v. Medley, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246, 1250 (K.B. 1834)). See also United States v.
Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1947) (a responsible party may not avoid
criminal liability by delegating responsibility to a subordinate).
97. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 425 ("Opponents of the strict liability doctrine argue that
its justifications are inconsistent with both utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment."). The
statement assumes that retribution remains an acceptable basis for punishment. In Morissette,
discussing the historical requirement for scienter, the Supreme Court quoted its previous observation
that: "'Retribution is no longer the dominate objective of the criminal law .... We also there
referred to a prevalent modem philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offenders
and not merely the crime." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251 n.5 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949)).
98. Levenson observed: "If the defendant crosses those limits, intentionally or unintentionally,
society will seek to punish the defendant's behavior. The strict liability doctrine thereby serves an
important function of setting firm limits on conduct that society is loath to tolerate." Levenson,
supra note 18, at 424. That may be true in the instance Levenson gives as an example, felony
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to over-deter individuals' behavior."" In addition, strict criminal liability re-
verses the classic principle of the common law that "it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than one innocent person suffer."'" For these reasons, many
courts have expressed misgivings about the application of strict criminal liabil-
ity,' including under the MBTA."2 Perhaps most frequently cited concerning the
extent of MBTA strict liability are the Second Circuit decision in United States
v. FMC Corp.,3 and two federal district court cases.'
In FMC Corp., the court affirmed MBTA misdemeanor convictions for bird
deaths resulting from FMC's discharge of wastewater, from pesticide manufac-
turing, into a pond that attracted migratory birds.' °' After migratory birds were
found dead at the pond, FMC attempted various measures to scare the birds
murder, but for felony murder, the defendant normally undertakes to commit some felony requiring a
wrongful intent. In other cases, the quoted rationale misses the point that, in the course of seeking to
brand conduct society is loath to tolerate, Congress may also punish activity that is useful and
necessary to a modem society that may inevitably kill some birds regardless of the degree of care
and attention exercised by those undertaking the activity.
99. Levenson, supra note 18, at 426, 427 n. 137 (quoting Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the
Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109). While it may be true that strict criminal liability may
overdeter, the objection does not address the question of whether it is for Congress to make the
policy judgment or for the courts.
100. Levenson, supra note 18, at 427 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTON, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 73 (2d ed. 1972)); see Zipperman, supra note 6, at 140-41 (same).
101. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (Courts have construed public welfare statutes that are
silent as to intent as dispensing with the intent requirement but "[t]his has not, however, been
without expressions of misgiving.").
102. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Van Fossan, affirmed a conviction
for poisoning pigeons that the city authorities had ordered the defendant to remove. See United
States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1990). The Court observed that:
People who assault federal officers commit a federal crime without knowing that
the victim is a federal officer ... perhaps those who assault birds need not know
the victims are migratory. On the other hand, an attack on a person is
presumptively criminal, and the offender has no compelling interest in which
body of law supplies the penalty.
Van Fossan, 899 F.2d at 639 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit, in the course of affirming a
conviction for hunting on a baited field, observed that strict liability is a harsh rule, which can
ensnare the subjectively innocent, but that it is for Congress and the Secretary of the Interior to
change it. See United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) ("We concede that [strict
liability] is a harsh rule and trust that prosecution will take place in the exercise of sound discretion
only."). See also United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The hunter is therefore
placed in a precarious position. He must determine the intent of the individual who seeded the area
before undertaking the hunt and, if he errs in that determination, he is criminally responsible. A
subjectively 'innocent' person can unwittingly run afoul of the regulation.").
103. 572 F.2d 902 (2nd Cit. 1978). For discussions of United States v. FMC Corp., see George
Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 188-89, 191-92, 196 (1979), Scott Finet, Habitat Protection
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 17 nn.72-73, 18 nn.75-76 (1996), and
Benjamin Means, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 825 nn.l 1-13 (1998).
104. See United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 744 (D. Idaho 1989); United States v.
Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal.), affd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). For
discussions of Corbin Farm, see Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 185-87, 191-92; Finet, supra
note 103, at 16 n.69, 18 n.75, and Means, supra note 103, at 825 nn.l 1-12.
105. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905,908.
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away from the pond, including Styrofoam floats, loud cannon explosions, and
guards.'- Neighbors complained of the noise, and the guards fell asleep and ne-
glected their duties .... .FMC argue[d] that it had no intention to kill birds, that it
took no affirmative act to do so, possessed no scienter, and thus should not be
held liable under the Act.'"'
The Second Circuit rejected FMC's arguments, quoting from Morissette
that, "[tihe criminal law may punish 'neglect where the law requires care, or
inaction where it imposes a duty."'"' Analogizing to strict liability in tort, the
court noted that FMC was engaged in the manufacture of a dangerous pesticide
and, therefore, Congress in the MBTA reasonably held such persons strictly
accountable for unforeseeable consequences of this extra-hazardous activity.'
Nonetheless, the court was careful to note that "[imposing strict liability on
FMC in this case does not dictate that every death of a bird will result in impos-
ing strict criminal liability on some party .... The court also noted that
"[c]ertainly construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such
as deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, for] plate glass modem office
buildings ... would offend reason and common sense.""' The court noted that,
in any event, "'(a)n innocent technical violation ... can be taken care of by the
106. See id. at 905.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 906.
109. Id. at 907 (quoting United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952)).
110. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907-08. The Supreme Court's opinion in Staples v. United
States described "'deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials' [as things that] put
their owners on notice that they stand 'in responsible relation to a public danger."' Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1994) (quoting United States v. International Minerals & Chem.
Group, 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)).
However, dangerousness alone is not sufficient to assume that Congress intended to impose strict
liability. The appropriateness of the things to their neighborhood is also important to strict liability
analysis because, as the Supreme Court stated, "[elven dangerous items can, in some cases, be so
commonplace and generally available that we would not consider them to alert individuals to the
likelihood of strict regulation." Id. at 611. Curiously, in light of the MBTA's strict criminal liability
for hunting violations, the Supreme Court held that the destructive potential of guns does not put
their owners on notice of potential regulations. See id. at 610-11.
The real meaning of Staples is that guns will not be treated as drugs were treated in Balint,
no matter how destructive they may be. A defendant need not know the nature of drugs he or she
possesses but he or she must know the nature of any firearm in order to be criminally liable for
violating any regulations applicable to the type of firearm. Compare Staples, 511 U.S. at 611, with
Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("[The Narcotic Act's] manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in
drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute,
and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him."). The logic of the
distinction may be lost on a generation that grew up with widespread use of both drugs and guns,
and with frequent debates over whether to increase or loosen the regulation of each, as it would have
been lost on those who grew up in an era (not long before the Court issued its decision in Balint)
devoid of any regulation of drugs.
11. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908.
112. See id. at 905. Expressions of concern over the complexity of the law, prosecutorial
discretion, and mens rea or scienter requirements are a frequent theme in environmental criminal
law. The relationship of the myths to empirical reality has recently been examined by Kathleen F.
Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion, and Structural Reform, 84
IOWA L. REV. 115 (1998).
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
imposition of a small or nominal fine' [and] [s]uch situations properly can be
left to the sound discretion of prosecutors and the courts .....
Commentators have observed that the Second Circuit relied upon the ultra
hazardous nature of pesticide manufacture, and that in future MBTA cases the
Second Circuit may not deem criminal seemingly less-hazardous activities that
result in unintended deaths of migratory birds."' However, as noted by at least
one authority, the Second Circuit's list of presumably non-hazardous activities
itself is subject to question. For example, "a motor vehicle is a dangerous in-
strumentality and its operation is a task demanding constant alertness; if the
motorist's attention wanders, the death of a bird or other living thing is not a
bizarre occurrence."" '
In United States v. Rollins,"' Rollins had sprayed a field of alfalfa using a
registered pesticide, Furadan, which he had used before without problem.'" Un-
fortunately, on the instance at issue, geese ingested alfalfa and pesticide and
died."' The District Court focused on the reasonableness of Rollin's actions and
the foreseeability of the outcome."9 The court concluded that the MBTA was
vague and failed to give Rollins fair notice that poisoning migratory birds by
pesticide, used in accordance with label instructions, is a crime.'20 Rollins clearly
turned on the court's view that the outcome of the defendant's actions was not
foreseeable rather than whether the outcome of "dead birds" was a violation of
the MBTA.
In United States v. Corbin Farm Service,'2' the United States charged a pesti-
cide dealer, his employee, an aerial spray operator, and the owner of the field
sprayed, with 10 counts for bird deaths resulting from the single application of
pesticides to an alfalfa field.'"2 In considering pretrial motions to dismiss, the
court held that:
113. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905 (quoting United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.
D. Ky. 1939)).
114. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 76-78 (3d ed. 1997); Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 190-92; Margolin, supra
note 14, at 992-6, 999-1001; Betsy Vencil, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act-Protecting Wildlife on
Our National Refuges-California's Kesterson Reservoir, a Case in Point, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J.
609, 616-25 (1986); Woodrum, supra note 14, at 248-52.
115. Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 192. See also infra Part VII (Bird Deaths Caused By
Instrumentalities of Modem Civilization Are Foreseeable and Avoidable). Lower courts are not
alone in their solicitude to automobile drivers. In Staples, the Supreme Court suggested that it would
not accept strict criminal liability for automobile emission control violations absent a clear
expression of Congressional intent. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 614. The Court's suggestion in Staples
is inconsistent with the prevalence of strict criminal liability for speeding violations and with the
Court's decision in Chicago, B., & Q. Ry. v. United States, in which it held that the defendant's
reasonable care and ignorance of deficiencies in train car repairs was no defense to an enforcement
action. See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 568-70,579 (1911).
116. 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho 1989).
117. See Rollins, 706 F. Supp. at 743.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 743-44
120. See id. at 744-45.
121. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
122. See Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 515.
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The instant case is one in which the guilty act alone is sufficient to
make out the crime. When dealing with pesticides, the public is put on
notice that it should exercise care to prevent injury to the environment
and to other persons; a requirement of reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances of this case does not offend the Constitution. If defendants
acted with reasonable care or if they were powerless to prevent the
violation, then a very different question would be presented.'"
Thus, the District Court in Corbin Farm based its decision on the known hazards
of pesticides and the foreseeable consequences, as had the Second Circuit in
FMC Corp. It made explicit the reasonable care standard implicit in Rollins,
thereby raising the possibility of a due care defense.''
VI. DEFENSES, LIMITATIONS, AND AMELIORATIONS TO STRICT
LIABILITY
In an effort to ameliorate the harsh effects of strict criminal liability with
respect to the "innocent," courts have relied upon a number of theories and de-
fenses, including reinterpretation of the statute,'" due process, proximate causa-
tion,' " minimal punishment, good faith, due care, impossibility, and relying on
prosecutorial discretion."' Often courts use defenses to obtain "justice" in indi-
123. Id. at 536 (citing United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1964)).
124. See BEAN, supra note 114, at 76-78; Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 186-87;
Margolin, supra note 14, at 994-96, 999-1001; Woodrum, supra note 14, at 252-53.
125. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 429 & n.148 (citing examples of cases reading an intent
requirement in statutory crimes).
126. See infra Part VLC (Proximate Causation).
127. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 432-33. Arguably, still other defenses could be raised. For
example, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause might be invoked to bar particularly severe
punishment of a defendant the court views as innocent of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Stepniewski v.
Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571 n.3 (1984) (the Cruel and Unusual Clause "proscribes punishment
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime .... ") (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 667 (1977)). The ambiguity of the terms "severe punishment" and "innocence" leave a great
deal of room for creativity. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 227, 229 (1957)
(describing a $250 fine and three years probation as "heavy criminal penalties").
In at least two situations, the Supreme Court has observed that a number of related theories
have been used independently and together to adjust the balance between protecting the innocent and
convicting the corrupt.
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress
have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of
adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (quoting Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-
36 (1968)). One might add good faith to the list.
An additional defense to strict liability in tort is performance of a public duty. See
KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 567. An analogous issue under the MBTA remains undecided, that
being whether government contractors share the federal government's immunity from prosecution.
See Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (11 th Cir. 1997) ("It [the MBTA] does not apply to
the federal government."); Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d
110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) ("MBTA does not appear to apply to the activities of federal government
agencies."); Curry v. United States Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 548 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("The
MBTA, by its plain language, does not subject the federal government to its prohibitions").
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vidual cases while still upholding a strict liability interpretation of the criminal
statute."'
A. Reinterpretation
Although most courts have consistently held the MBTA criminal provisions
to be strict liability crimes, some courts have struggled with whether to read an
intent requirement into the MBTA criminal provisions.
In the course of rejecting a due process challenge to the MBTA, the Third
Circuit held that, if there were a due process problem, it would be "impermissi-
ble 'judicial legislation"' to correct the statute by adding an intent element to the
MBTA felony provision. "' On the other hand, in reviewing a misdemeanor con-
viction for violation of baiting regulations, the Fifth Circuit chose to part com-
pany with every other Circuit Court of Appeals and to interpret MBTA regula-
tions as requiring elements of intent."' Significantly, in both instances in which a
federal circuit court expressed objections to the absence of scienter in a MBTA
prosecution, Congress has amended the statute, even when the weight of judicial
authority supported strict criminal liability under the MBTA°"'
However, in a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
MBTA does apply to federal government officials, at least in some instances. See Humane Soc'y of
the United States v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (MBTA prohibitions against harming
birds apply to the federal government but the criminal sanctions do not).
128. Apparently even the most ardent supporters of the MBTA among environmentalists are
not prepared to argue for strict criminal liability in all instances. For example, environmentalists
have challenged the FWS for not restricting loggers but has not argued for an elimination of bird
mortality, instead arguing for a significant reduction. See, e.g., Submission to the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, submitted by Alliance for the Rockies, et aL, November 17, 1999,
Section 6, page 17 (ID: SEM-99-002) ("FWS has the flexibility to craft regulations that implement
and enforce the MBTA in a way that significantly reduces the impacts of logging operations on
migratory birds while allowing logging, an activity that the Submitting Parties recognize as an
economically valuable use of forests."), <http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides.registry/
registrytext.efm?%varlan=english&documentid=220>.
129. United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425,431 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Engler,
627 F. Supp. 196, 199 (M. D. Pa. 1985).
130. See United States v. Delahoussaye, 572 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit's
decision was based in part on a desire not to see judges as defendants in MBTA prosecutions. See
Delahoussa ve, 573 F.2d at 912-13 ("Any other interpretation would simply render criminal
conviction an unavoidable occasional consequence of duck hunting and deny the sport to those such
as, say, judges who might find such a consequence unacceptable."). At least one court has also read
an intent requirement into the MBTA in instances of indirect action modifying habitat, such as,
logging. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1579 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ("The
MBTA does not apply to other activities [other than those intended to harm birds] that result in
unintended deaths of migratory birds."). However, other courts addressing logging have not relied
upon the defendant's intention, but, instead, rely solely on the purported indirect nature of the harm
to birds. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir.1991) ("[Precedent
does] not suggest that habitat destruction, leading indirectly to bird deaths, amounts to the 'taking' of
migratory birds within the meaning of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.").
131. Compare Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Section 501, Pub. L. No. 99-645,
100 Stat. 3582, 3590 (1986) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) felony provision to include requirement
for knowledge), with supra note 17 (cases affirming strict MBTA criminal liability).
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B. Due Process
The Due Process Clause contains basically four requirements for crimi-
nal statutes. Due process: (1) prohibits statutes from shifting burdens of
proof onto defendants; (2) prohibits the punishment of wholly passive
conduct; (3) protects against vague and overbroad statutes; and (4) re-
quires that statutes give fair warnings of prohibited conduct. 'The due
process clause imposes little other restraint on the state's power to de-
fine criminal acts.' . . . Essentially, the more a regulation prohibits what
an average citizen would consider wholly innocent behavior, the more
likely a legislature must require knowledge of the law as an element of
the crime. "2
Due process challenges to strict criminal liability have focused on the sec-
ond (punishment of passive conduct) and fourth (fair warning) requirements of
due process.
Perhaps the leading case for the due process defense to strict criminal liabil-
ity was Lambert v. California.'" Lambert was a resident of Los Angeles for over
seven years and, during that time, she was convicted of forgery, a felony.'" The
Los Angeles Municipal Code made it unlawful for any felon to stay in Los An-
geles for more than five days without registering, "' which Lambert failed to do.'"
She was convicted of failing to register, fined $250, and placed on probation for
three years. ' The Supreme Court characterized Lambert's conduct as "wholly
passive-mere failure to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the fail-
ure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of
his deed ..... Stating that a requirement of notice is engrained in the concept of
due process, the Court held that the registration requirement violated due proc-
ess, in the absence of either proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the
requirement or that she had an opportunity to register and avoid criminal penal-
ties once she learned of the ordinance.'" One might ask whether the result would
132. Jenkins, supra note 18, at 600-01 (internal citations omitted); accord Stepniewski, 732
F.2d at 571. But see United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985) (MBTA felony
provision was a strict liability crime but, as such, it violated due process because the penalty was not
"relatively small" and a conviction might "gravely besmirch" the defendant's reputation). Taking
exception to the Sixth Circuit's conclusions, the Third Circuit found no due process problem with
strict criminal liability. See Engler, 806 F.2d at 433. Significantly, affirming the strict criminal
liability, the Third Circuit rejected the prosecution's concession that the absence of a scienter
requirement in the MBTA felony provision violated due process. See id.
133. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
134. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 227.
138. Id. at 228.
139. See id. at 228-29. In a subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court described its Lambert
decision as holding "that a person could not be punished for a 'crime' of omission, if that person did
not know, and the State had taken no reasonable steps to inform him, of his duty to act and of the
criminal penalty for failure to do so." Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 n.27 (1968). Although not
mentioned by the Court in the quoted passage, in Lambert, the Court's concern that the defendant,
upon learning of the registration requirement, was unable to register without risking a criminal
penalty suggests Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues were coupled with the due process
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have been the same if Lambert had moved into Los Angeles (active conduct)
after conviction of a felony, or if her felony conviction had been for child mo-
lesting."0
In United States v. Engler," the Third Circuit reviewed a conviction under
the original, strict liability felony provision of the MBTA, for sale of bird parts.
In a very thoroughly reasoned opinion, the Third Circuit observed that the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly affirmed felony convictions in strict liability crimi-
nal prosecutions."' From its review of the Supreme Court cases, the Third Cir-
cuit discerned criteria for distinguishing permissible and impermissible use of
strict liability in criminal cases, particularly in light of United States v. Freed.
There [in Freed], the Court distinguished two types of strict liability
crimes. Strict liability for omissions which are not "per se blamewor-
thy" may violate due process because such derelictions are "'unlike the
commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that
should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed."' By contrast,
due process is not violated by the imposition of strict liability as part of
"a regulatory measure in the interest of public safety, which may well
be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn
that [the prohibited conduct] is not an innocent act.""'
In Lambert terms, Engler's conduct was active and such that Engler should
have known there would be regulations governing his trade.
C. Proximate Causation
The Supreme Court has observed that:
In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eter-
nity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events,
and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis
would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would 'set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.""
notice problem. See Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229 ("this appellant . . . was given no opportunity to
comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent.").
140. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14072(i) (Supp. 2000) (knowing failure of certain sexual offenders to
register with the FBI is punishable by up to one year in prison and, for second offenses, by up to 10
years). Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent in Lambert, said "I feel confident that the present
decision will turn out to be an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on
the waters of the law." Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
141. 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986).
142. See Engler, 806 F.2d at 433-36 (citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)
(possession of unregistered firearm); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (bigamous
cohabitation); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipment of misbranded or
adulterated drugs; felony for subsequent offenses); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)
(unlawful drug sale); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (cutting timber on
state lands)).
143. Engler, 806 F.2d at 435 (quoting United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608, 609 (1971))
(internal citations omitted).
144. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 n.10 (1992) (quoting
KEETON, supra note 22, § 41, at 264 (quoting North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 245, 59 N.W. 1012
(1894))).
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Proximate causation is a tool courts use to "limit a person's responsibility
for the consequences of that person's own acts.'""
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home,'" an Endangered Species Act (ESA)" case, pro-
ponents of logging challenged ESA regulations which expanded the statutory
definition of harm to include significant "habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife ..... In responding to the dissent's con-
tention that the ESA provisions could encompass remote and unforeseeable
consequences, the majority of the Supreme Court suggested that proximate cau-
sation would be required.''
We do not agree with the dissent that the regulation covers results that
are not "even foreseeable... no matter how long the chain of causality
between modification and injury." Respondents have suggested no rea-
son why either the "knowingly violates" or the "otherwise violates"
provision of the statute - or the "harm" regulation itself - should not
be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation
and foreseeability."0
145. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. Holmes listed three reasons for requiring proximate causation in
civil cases, two of which also have application to criminal case: "First, the less direct the injury is,
the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the
violation, as distinct from other, independent factors .... And, finally, the need to grapple with these
problems [of remote causation] is unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct..
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
146. 515 U.S. 687 (1995), For discussion of the Sweet Home decision and its implications, see
generally Tara L. Mueller, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities: When Is Habitat
Modification A Take?, 3 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 333 (1996).
147. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531- 1544 (1994). The ESA includes a general
intent crime requiring knowing conduct. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§
1540(a)(1), (b)(1)). The ESA also includes a strict liability civil penalty provision applicable to "any
person who otherwise violates" the Act. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9 (citing 16 U.S.C. §
1540(a)( 1 )).
148. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691-92.
149. See id. at 696 n.9. The foreseeability (and avoidability) analysis introduced by proximate
cause analysis relates to outcomes of actions and is distinct from the foreseeability of the existence
of regulations by one possessing or using deleterious materials. See supra Part IV (Judicial
Acceptance of Strict Criminal Liability) (discussing rationales used by courts affirming strict
criminal liability).
150. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9. See also id. at 700, n.13 (the regulation is subject to
"ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability"). Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion, agreed that criminal liability is limited by proximate causation. See id. at 709
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("the regulation's application is limited by ordinary principles of
proximate causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability."). Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia,
joined by two others, agreed that criminal liability is limited by proximate causation under the ESA
but he differed as to the meaning of proximate cause. See id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In fact
'proximate' causation simply means 'direct' causation.") (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103
(5th ed. 1979)).
Additional insight into the thinking of the Supreme Court on proximate cause can be
gotten by examining its decision in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Company, 513 U.S. 527 (1995), an admiralty tort case. Justice O'Connor authored the Grubart
opinion. She also wrote a concurring opinion in Sweet Home that discussed proximate causation at
length. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court did not explain
the limits imposed by proximate causation but, in Grubart, it did describe those limits as being less
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Recently, in United States v. Moon Lake Electrical Ass'n.,"' an MBTA case
involving arguably unintended bird deaths, a district court invoked proximate
causation. Moon Lake was charged with electrocution of migratory birds, caused
by Moon Lake's failure to install inexpensive protective devices on 2,450 power
poles. 2 Although the court affirmed that the MBTA imposes strict liability, the
court went on to state "the government must prove that Moon Lake's power
lines constitute the cause in fact, as well as the proximate cause, of death .....
[T]he government must prove proximate causation, also known as "le-
gal causation," beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, "proximate
cause" is generally defined as "that which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if the
injury be one which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a
natural consequence of the wrongful act.","'
Application of proximate causation (foreseeability) to MBTA offenses is an
avenue courts may use to solve the dilemma of "absurd and unintended
results""' that may "offend reason and common sense.".... For the traditional
direct harm cases, such as hunting, poaching, and trapping, harm is intended
and, therefore, extremely foreseeable. For the indirect harm cases, proximate
causation analysis provides a method for distinguishing foreseeable harms, for
which defendants may reasonably be held accountable, from unforeseeably re-
mote harms, for which some courts do not believe persons may reasonably be
held accountable."'
stringent than those proposed by Grubart which were that the harm be close in time and space to the
activity that caused it: that it must occur "reasonably contemporaneously" with the negligent conduct
and within reach of the device causing the harm. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 536.
151. 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
152. See Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2dat 1071.
153. Id. at 1077.
154. Id. at 1085 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th Ed. 1990)). The court in Moon
Lake relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Sweet Home. See id. at 1077 (citing Sweet Home,
515 U.S. at 692).
155. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
156. United States v. FMC, 572 F.2d 902, 905 (1978). Related to proximate cause is the
absence of the actus reas, as when the defendant acted involuntarily. See Levenson, supra note 18, at
431 (giving as an example an epileptic's actions during a seizure). Levenson states that British courts
have used the absence of an actus reas to avoid strict liability for serious crimes, for example when
another slips narcotics into the defendant's bag without the defendant's knowledge). See Levenson,
supra note 18, at 431 n.156 (citing Regina v. Warner, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1303, 1345 (Eng.)). See also
KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 563-64 (defendant is not strictly liable in tort for forces of nature
and independent actions of third persons or animals not reasonably foreseeable).
157. Notwithstanding that MBTA crimes have no requirement for scienter, a proximate
causation requirement introduces an element of knowledge. A person's knowledge or opportunities
for knowledge become very relevant to the ability to foresee and avoid bird mortality. The following
are some examples of evidence that might be available to prove a defendant's knowledge and
opportunities for knowledge: government, educational, or industry training programs;
announcements and articles in publications and trade journals; prior experience and reports,
including accident and incident reports; discussions or inquiries with regulatory authorities; and
permits and permit applications.
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The court in Moon Lake indicated that it would observe the same limits on
the MBTA as the Second Circuit in FMC Corp., albeit under the different theory
of proximate causation.
Because the death of a protected bird is generally not a probable conse-
quence of driving an automobile, piloting an airplane, maintaining an
office building, or living in a residential dwelling with a picture win-
dow, such activities would not normally result in liability under §
707(a), even if such activities would cause the death of protected birds.
Proper application of the law to an MBTA prosecution, therefore,
should not lead to absurd results."
To the extent that proximate cause limits criminal liability to reasonably
foreseeable and avoidable consequences,"' it adds nothing to the many alterna-
tive theories for limiting strict criminal liability, e.g., due process, due care, etc.
The theory offers no new criteria for distinguishing reasonably foreseeable mi-
gratory bird deaths caused by cars, planes, and towers from unexpected bird
deaths caused by other less predictable causes such as the pesticides used by the
defendant in FMC. Fundamentally, proximate causation is "in the eye of the
beholder."'" After all is said and done, proximate cause is as much a policy deci-
sion to cut off the chain of causation as it is a determination of "proximate" as
opposed to "remote" causes. ' As a policy decision, proximate causation en-
158. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. See Margolin, supra note 14, at 1007 (endorsing "the
Model Penal Code proposal that the actual result be a 'probable consequence of the actor's
conduct'). See also infra note 201 (probability of bird death or injury was only 0.0064 per pole per
year).
159. For a description of different proximate cause tests, see Stephen Scallan, Proximate Cause
Under RICO, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455, 458-59 (1996) (analyzing "last human wrongdoer test," "cause
and condition test," "justly attachable test," and Palsgrafforeseeability analysis).
Judge Andrews' dissent in Palsgraf argued that one owes a duty not to individual
foreseeable victims, but to the public at large:
Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary
danger, not to protect A. B, or C alone .... Every one owes to the world at large
the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of
others .... Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected
to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would
generally be thought the danger zone.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102-03 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
160. Mueller. supra note 146, at 338-39 (observing that proximate causation is especially in the
eye of the beholder when framed in terms of "foreseeability" rather than "duty" or "remote" cause,
and that the close connection between the erosion and the death of fish in the Sweet Home case
would have been obvious to anyone with a minimal understanding of basic ecology). For a mind-
bending essay on how dependent criminal liability is upon perception, or what the author calls "path-
dependence," see Leo Katz, Proximate Cause in Michael Moore's Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513 (1994). Among other things, Mr. Katz describes the dramatically different treatment we
accord deaths caused by "ducking" and deaths caused by "shielding." See id. at 1516-17 (describing
and quoting Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen, Ducking Harm, 85 J. PHIL. 115 (1988)). An
example is the different treatment accorded death caused by a bear capturing a camper left by her
faster companion and death caused by a camper throwing his companion to the bear in order to save
himself. Id. (citing Boorse & Sorensen at 115-16).
161. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) ("At bottom,
the notion of proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively
possible and convenient."') (quoting KEETON, supra note 22, § 41, at 264)). Although Holmes was a
civil case, its description of proximate cause is equally applicable to strict criminal liability. "[T]he
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croaches on the prerogative of Congress to make national policy'62 or the discre-
tion of the prosecutor to enforce the law.
D. Minimal Punishment
One way to mitigate the injustice of strict criminal liability, in the absence of
defenses to weed out the "innocent," would be to exercise discretion in sen-
tencing. Such an approach has been recommended by several commentators"'
although even minimal punishment is cold consolation for the defendant who
could not reasonably foresee the criminal liability or was powerless to prevent
it. ,"
The reliance on light punishment, or prosecutorial discretion, is often in-
voked by courts, United States v. FMC Corp.,6 and by Congress but it has not
been universally persuasive. In United States v. Rollins,' the United States Dis-
trict Court for Idaho expressly rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
FMC Corp. with the observation that, "[w]ith deference to the respected tradi-
tion of the Second Circuit, a violation of due process cannot be cured by light
punishment .....
The definition of minimum and severe criminal penalties is highly subjec-
tive. For example, in Lambert, the U.S. Supreme Court described a $250 fine
and three-year probation as "heavy criminal penalties."" In order to eliminate
the subjectiveness and the disparity in sentences, Congress enacted the United
States Sentencing Guidelines." The Guidelines attempt to foreclose sentencing
discretion for most federal crimes,' ° albeit not for MBTA strict liability
offenses,'' in part because the Guidelines understandably assume that those
awaiting sentencing after conviction are not innocent."2
proximate cause inquiry is based on an unpredictable ... policy analysis, performed on a case-by-
case basis. Relying on such a policy-based analysis to limit liability for harm is inappropriate when
Congress has already made the hard policy choice ... " Mueller, supra note 146, at 341. As used in
tons, proximate cause is also ordinarily a policy limitation. See KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 560.
162. See Mueller, supra note 146, at 340-41 (in the context of the ESA and the Sweet Home
decision, but equally applicable to the judicial limits on MBTA strict liability: "Congress has already
made the hard policy choice ... it is improper for the courts to arrogate to themselves the authority
to limit an individual's liability .... ).
163. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 433 n.168.
164. Cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) ("Even one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold.").
165. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of FMC, see supra notes 103-115 and
accompanying text.
166. 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho 1989).
167. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. at 745.
168. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
169. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1998).
170. See U.S.S.G. § 1A3 (1998).
171. MBTA strict liability offenses are petty offenses to which the Guidelines do not apply.
Compare Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (maximum
sentence for MBTA strict liability misdemeanors is 6 months), with 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7) (1994)
(defining as Class B misdemeanors offenses for which the maximum sentence is 6 months) and
U.S.S.G. § IB.1.9 (Guidelines are not applicable to Class B misdemeanors).
172. The Sentencing Commission treated technical and administrative regulatory offenses as
being of four types, beginning with failure to comply without knowledge or intent, and progressing
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E. Good Faith, Due Care, and Impossibility
Good faith is not generally recognized as a defense to strict criminal liabil-
ity.'7' Although not used as a defense in MBTA cases, good faith or due care has
been suggested as a defense in dicta."' Introduction of a good faith defense shifts
strict criminal liability in the direction of negligence because it makes the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's actions and omissions an issue."'
An extreme form of a "due care" defense is impossibility. The U.S. Supreme
Court implicitly recognized a "powerless to protect against" defense to strict
criminal liability in United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co."' The Court did
not discuss or rule on the possible defense other than to state that "it involves
factual proof to be raised defensively at a trial on the merits""' and, therefore,
was not before the court.
In United States v. Park,"' the U.S. Supreme Court expressly recognized an
affirmative defense of objective impossibility.
to violations with knowledge or intent of consequences. See U.S.S.G. § IA4(f) (Regulatory
Offenses). The Guidelines make no reference to inadvertent offenses or offenses that occurred
notwithstanding the exercise of due care or even extreme care by the defendant.
For environmental offenses, the Sentencing Guidelines expressly assume knowing conduct
and, for misdemeanors, allow an unlimited reduction of the sentence in cases involving negligent
conduct. See id. § 2QI.3, comment (n.3). There is not a similar provision for wildlife offenses or
environmental felonies. See id. §§ 2QI (Environment), 2Q2.1 (Offenses Involving Fish, Wildlife,
and Plants).
173. See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622-23 (1st Cir. 1974) (looking
at the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407, prosecution: "we reject the existence of any generalized 'due
care' defense that would allow a polluter to avoid conviction on the ground that he took precautions
conforming to industry-wide or commonly accepted standards"); Levenson, supra note 18, at 417
(stating that because liability is imposed irrespective of the defendant's knowledge or intentions,
"the strict liability doctrine traditionally rejects even a reasonable mistake of a fact or circumstance
material to a finding of guilt"). Arguably, one could distinguish White Fuel in a future case in which
a defendant exceeded commonly accepted standards and took all reasonable steps to use
extraordinary care.
For a case in which good faith was recognized as a defense to strict criminal liability, see
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kantor). Kantor was a
child pornography case and was unique in that the absence of a good faith defense raised serious
First Amendment issues. Id. at 540-42. The Ninth Circuit observed that the case involved an actress
who "allegedly engaged in a deliberate and successful effort to deceive the entire industry . Id.
at 543. For a thorough discussion of Kantor and of a proposal for application of a good faith defense
to strict liability crimes, see generally Levenson, supra note 18.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 519 (E.D. Cal.), affid on
other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). See discussion of Corbin Farm, supra notes 121-124
and accompanying text.
175. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 405 n.22 ("The good faith defense essentially transforms a
strict liability crime into a negligence offense, in which the defendant must prove reasonable conduct
under the circumstances."). Strict criminal liability with a good faith defense would differ from a
negligence offense in that the defendant would bear the burden of presenting evidence of his or her
good faith even in the absence of any prosecution evidence of negligence while, for a negligence
offense, the prosecution must present a prima facie case of negligence that necessarily denies the
defendant's good faith. Id. at 405-06.
176. 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964).
177. Id.
178. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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The theory upon which responsible corporate agents are held criminally
accountable for "causing" violations of the Act permits a claim that a
defendant was "powerless" to prevent or correct the violation to "be
raised defensively at a trial on the merits." [But] the defendant has the
burden of coming forward with evidence .... "'
A few lower court decisions have considered and rejected the impossibility
defense in opinions elaborating the high hurdle a defendant must clear to present
the defense."' In United States v. Gel Spice Co., Inc."' the court noted that "im-
possibility is an affirmative defense, .... available only to individuals and not to
corporations,'9 and that: "To establish the impossibility defense the corporate
officer must introduce evidence that he exercised extraordinary care, but was
nevertheless unable to prevent violations of the Act."'"
In a pair of 1976 cases,"' the Ninth Circuit accepted the concept of an af-
firmative defense of impossibility"' but held that the defendants had failed to
present sufficient evidence to submit the defense to the fact finder.' 7 In United
States v. Y. Hata, the court held that (1) "the duty ...to 'remedy violations
when they occur' includes the duty to consider and experiment"' with common-
place devices "long before" government inspections uncover violations,"' and
(2) the defendants failed to offer proof that "they planned and attempted to in-
stall" corrections or that those plans and attempts were frustrated by their inabil-
ity to obtain materials." In other words, the "defendant could have attempted to
prevent the injury earlier.""'
In United States v. Starr, the court held that the "duty of 'foresight and
vigilance' requires the defendant to foresee and prepare" for natural and artifi-
cial occurrences."' For example, an infestation of mice fleeing freshly plowed
fields could be anticipated with "a minimum of foresight," and, consequently,
179. Park, 421 U.S. at 673 (quoting Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. at 91). Park
described the impossibility defense as resting on the responsible corporate officer theory. The theory
for criminal liability for responsible corporate officers is essentially the same as the rationale for
strict criminal liability of individuals. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Consequently, the
impossibility defense should be available to individuals who are not corporate officers.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Gel Spice Co., 601 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
181. 601 F. Supp. at 1207 (involving the prosecution of company, its president, and its vice-
president for rodent contamination of warehoused food).
182. Gel Spice, 601 F. Supp. at 1213 n.7.
183. Id. at 1212-13.
184. Id. at 1213.
185. United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming conviction related
to bird infestation in food warehouse); United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976)
(affirming conviction for mice infestation and contamination in warehoused food caused when
plowing of adjacent field drove out mice).
186. See Hata, 535 F.2d at 510 (requiring "sufficient appropriate facts" before allowing the
defense of "objective impossibility"); Starr, 535 F.2d at 515 (placing an additional burden on
government only if defendant offers to prove impossibility).
187. See Hata, 535 F.2d at 511; Starr, 535 F.2d at 515.
188. Hata, 535 F.2d at 511 (citation omitted) (finding a large wire mesh enclosure is a common
device) (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975)).
189. Id. at 511-512.
190. Jossen, supra note 20, at 41.
191. Starr, 535 F.2d at 515 (quoting Park, 421 U.S. at 673).
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preventing the infestation was not objectively impossible.'9 Responding to the
defendant's complaint that he was the victim of a janitor's failure to carry out
the defendant's instructions, the court stated, "The standard of 'foresight and
vigilance' encompasses a duty to anticipate and counteract the shortcomings of
delegees.' '3
It has been said that, as applied to indirect actors such as corporate supervi-
sors, the impossibility defense converts strict criminal liability into a "standard
of extraordinary care.'"
F. Prosecutorial Discretion
Courts have expressly relied upon prosecutorial discretion to ameliorate the
harsh results that might result from rigid application of strict criminal liability.
"In such matters the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges,
and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted. Our system of criminal jus-
tice necessarily depends on 'conscience and circumspection in prosecuting offi-
cers.'"'"
Reliance on prosecutorial discretion is often invoked by courts and Con-
gress, but it has not been universally persuasive nor accepted without misgiv-
ings. '" That courts have, in some cases, rejected strict criminal liability is evi-
192. Id. at 515. For a case that recognized the possibility of a defense based on intervening acts
of third parties, arguably a form of an impossibility defense, see United States v. White Fuel Corp.,
498 F.2d 619, 623-24 (1st Cir. 1974) (rejecting due care as a defense to Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407,
strict criminal liability but, in dicta, recognizing defenses based on intervening acts of third parties
as a defense).
193. Starr, 535 F.2d at 515-16.
194. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1243, 1264-65 (April 1979). Some commentators
have argued that Park creates a standard of negligence which must be shown before the defendant
can be prosecuted under strict liability theory. See Park, 421 U.S. at 678-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Jossen, supra note 20, at 41-42 (citing Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liabili,, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 670-
71 (1984)). However, the impossibility defense is an affirmative defense. Then again, if Park
introduces a standard of negligence, the burden of coming forward with the evidence of due care or
impossibility is on the defendant. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
195. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (quoting Nash v. United States.
299 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)). See also United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902. 905 (2d Cir. 1978)
(stating that innocent technical violations can be handled through prosecutorial and court discretion).
The propriety of eliminating scienter or mens rea in statutes designed to serve a
regulatory purpose has again been recognized by the Supreme Court . . . . An
expansive statute under which the prosecution encounters such reduced obstacles
imposes a heavy responsibility upon the prosecutor. Many are his potential targets
and few are the standards by which the exercise of his discretion can be
measured. . . .Whatever his decision, it is likely to be one in keeping with the
political realities within which he functions. This is a part of the price that this
type of statute compels us to pay.
Zipperman, supra note 6, at 135 (quoting United States v. Chamay, 537 F.2d 341, 357 (9th Cir.)
(Sneed, J., concurring), cert. denied, Davis v. United States, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976)).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1084 (D. Colo.
1999) ("While prosecutors necessarily enjoy much discretion, proper construction of a criminal
statute cannot depend upon the good will of those who must enforce it."). For other factors limiting
unreasonable prosecutions, see Margolin, supra note 14, at 1006-1009 (allocation of burden of
proof, causation, judicial and prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification).
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dence that they could not and did not rely on prosecutorial discretion." How-
ever, whatever may be the validity of the misgivings, it must be recognized that,
to date, prosecutorial discretion alone has prevented the bringing of prosecutions
for the very situations that have given courts the most pause under the MBTA,
i.e., migratory birds killed by automobiles, aircraft, and towers.
VII. BIRD DEATHS CAUSED BY INSTRUMENTALITIES OF MODERN CIVILIZATION
ARE FORESEEABLE AND AVOIDABLE
Whatever theories the more restrictive courts use to limit strict criminal
liability, be they due process, proximate cause, due care, impossibility, etc., the
underlying requirements to imposition of strict criminal liability are that (1) the
consequences of the acts for which a defendant is to be held criminally liable
must (a) be foreseeable, and (b) be avoidable, and (2) the defendant must have
voluntarily assumed the risk of the consequences by volitional act or omission.
Objective data indicates that these criteria are met for human-caused non-
hunting migratory bird deaths, including those as to which courts have expressed
reservations concerning MBTA liability.
A. Foreseeable
Empirical data does not support statements that migratory bird deaths are not
a probable or foreseeable consequence of operating an automobile, an airplane
197. Levenson observes that "[mluch of strict liability law, including the Kantor case, has
evolved from unrestrained prosecutorial discretion." Levenson, supra note 18, at 432. Levenson
attributes lapses in the quality of prosecutorial discretion to intense public scrutiny and to the desire
of prosecutors for a favorable "conviction box score." Id. at 433. While such factors may influence
prosecutors to make decisions they would not otherwise make, it is just as likely that those factors
will deter difficult or unpopular prosecutions of serious wrongs. Any effort to limit discretion will
harm those who are presently protected by exercise of that discretion. Consider, for example, the
widespread dissatisfaction of federal judges with the limits imposed on their discretion by the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., John M. Dick, Allowing Sentence Bargains to Fall Outside
of the Guidelines Without Valid Departures: It Is Time For the Commission To Act, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 1017, 1034 (1997); Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge's
Dilemma, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 827, 833, 841 (1998) (stating that "judicial dismay with
current policy is widespread and sincere[;]" that judicial criticism is based on the limitation of
judicial discretion, the inducement to circumvent, the privacy of key decisions, and disparate and
harsh results; and that a 1996 Federal Judicial Center survey found over two-thirds of judges said the
mandatory guidelines were unnecessary); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 365, 366 (1992) (stating that "[olne
would think that most Americans, judges and legislators as well as members of the Sentencing
Commission, would be embarrassed by this implacable urge to incarcerate, by the overwhelming
desire to ignore the good that people have done and probably will do" and that "use of the guidelines
does tend to deaden the sense that a judge must treat each defendant as a unique human being").
The author's experience is that prosecutorial discretion is most often exercised to require
more than the minimum required proof, e.g., proof of knowledge of the facts for a MBTA strict
liability offense, and proof of knowledge of the legal requirements for "knowing" offenses such as
ESA offenses or most environmental crimes. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U. S. ATTORNEY'S
MANUAL, § 9-27.220 cmt (2000) (Principles of Federal Prosecution-Grounds for Commencing or
Declining Prosecution) (Federal prosecutors are not to initiate a prosecution unless they believe that
"admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction" but that "does
not mean that he/she necessarily should initiate or recommend prosecution.").
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or a tower.'9' Empirical data shows such bird deaths are foreseeable, and that
some are more numerous'" than are bird deaths from causes for which courts
have imposed MBTA strict liability, e.g., pesticide applications' and power
lines."0 The following are conservative or even very conservative estimates of
bird mortality from different causes other than habitat degradation and destruc-
tion.0-
Domestic and feral cats: 100's millions per year. A four year study by
the University of Wisconsin found that domestic cats killed between
7.8 and 219 million birds each year in just the rural areas of that State.2'
198. In addition, bird fatalities caused by modem instrumentalities other than firearms are not
only foreseeable, they are also a significant concern to regulatory authorities charged with protecting
migratory bird species.
"Regarding the big picture, we are most concerned about the cumulative impacts of all
towers on birds, combined with all the other things that kill them: habitat degradation and loss,
pesticides, glass windows, domestic cats, power lines, wind generators, cars, aircraft, oil spills, and
such." Dr. Albert M. Manville II, quoted by Chris Tollefson, Service to Host Workshop on Fatal
Bird Collisions with Communications Towers (revisited on Feb. 13, 2001) <http://www.fws.gov/
r9extaff/pr995 I.html>.
199. That something is a foreseeable consequence of action does not mean that it is a probable
outcome. When courts speak of probable consequences and probable cause, they are applying a
value judgment. In terms of scientific risk analysis, probability is a statistical measure of the number
of times an outcome will occur for a given number of times a causative action takes place. See
generally., ROBERT E. MEGILL, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS, Penn Well Books, Tulsa,
Oklahoma (2d ed. 1984) (defining probability and distinguishing outcomes with discrete
distributions from continuous or nondiscrete distributions such as occur in instances of bird
collisions). For example, a jet engine failure may occur once in every 20,000 hours of operation or
an auto accident may occur once in every 40,000 miles of operation. A given, objective, statistical
probability of an outcome may be subjectively "probable" to one court but unlikely to another.
The bird kills from different causes listed in the subsequent text of this article represent
totals and not probabilities. Nevertheless, they illustrate the relative magnitude of the threat
presented by different causes of bird deaths. The objective of the MBTA was to preserve bird
populations. For some probability calculations, see infra note 201 (probability of bird death or injury
upon which criminal liability was established in Moon Lake was 0.0064 birds per pole per year) and
note 230 (probability of fatal bird collision with a communication tower is 82 birds per tower per
year).
200. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
201. See United States v. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999). The Moon Lake
case is unique in providing sufficient information to calculate the probability of bird death or injury.
The prosecution was based on the death or injury of 38 birds by 2450 unprotected poles during 29
months. See id. at 1071. Consequently, the probability of a bird being killed or injured by any one
pole in any year was only 0.0064, or about two-thirds of one percent. That is an understatement of
the probability, inasmuch as the prosecution was limited to bird deaths or injuries that could be
conclusively proven, but it is the probability relied upon by the court. See, e.g., Ted Williams,
Zapped!, AUDUBON MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 32, 34 (reporting at least 170 raptor carcasses
were recovered under Moon Lake lines over an unspecified period). Data to be developed as part of
the plea agreement will allow a more accurate calculation of a presumably higher probability. See
infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text (describing Moon Lake plea agreement and MOU).
202. Most of the data in the text of this section were located by Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D,
and John Trapp, Wildlife Biologists, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, whose assistance the
author gratefully acknowledges.
203. See John S. Coleman and Stanley A. Temple, On the Prowl, Wisconsin Natural Resources
Magazine (Dec. 1996) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.wnrmag.com/stories/1996/dec96/
cats.htm> (intermediate estimate was that cats kill 38.7 million birds per year in rural Wisconsin).
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Building window impacts: 97 million to 970 million per year at a rate
of one to ten per building per year.:.2 "[B]irds do not recognize glass as
a barrier.
2 °
Pesticide ingestion: 67 million per year.2"
Cars and trucks: 57 million in the contiguous United States, or one per
car every three years. 7
Communication tower impacts: 4-5 million per year. 0"' This estimate
may be low by an order of magnitude, i.e., the actual fatalities may be
40 to 50 million birds each year.:
Coleman and Temple estimated that there are between 1.4 and 2.0 million feral cats in rural
Wisconsin alone. See id. See also John .S. Coleman et al., Cats and Wildlife: A Conservation
Dilemma (revisited on Feb. 14, 2001) <http://wildlife.wisc.edu/extension/catfly3.htm> ("Worldwide,
cats may have been involved in the extinction of more bird species than any other cause, except
habitat destruction."). Coleman and Temple identified a number of advantages enjoyed by domestic
cats and some feral cats, especially that supplemental feeding by humans means cat populations and
predation will not fall as bird prey are exterminated. See id. Cats also harm predatory animals by
reducing the number of their prey, i.e., reducing their food supply. See id.
204. Daniel Klem, Jr., Collisions Between Birds and Windows: Mortality and Prevention, 61 J.
FIELD ORNITHOL., Winter 1990, at 120, 123-25 (reporting that at least one-half of all bird strikes
against windows are fatal to the birds, regardless of size) [hereinafter Collisions]. See also T. 0.
Connell, Glass Windows and Bird Deaths, Proceedings N. Am. Omithological Conference, St.
Louis, Missouri. (Apr. 8, 1998) (describes study consistent with Klem's results and gives reasons
why his own results may have under-reported actual bird deaths) (on file with author); Erica H.
Dunn, Bird Mortality from Striking Residential Windows in Winter, 64 J. FIELD ORNITHOL., Summer
1993, at 302, 308 (estimates a range of window kills per home per year between 0.65 and 7.70,
suggesting Klem's range of I to 10 birds per building per year is realistic); Daniel Klem, Jr., Bird-
Window Collisions, 101 THE WILSON BULLETIN, December 1989, at 606, 620 (describing factors
contributing to birds' collisions with windows) [hereinafter Bird-Window Collisions].
205. See Klem, Collisions, supra note 204, at 124.
206. David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Pesticide Use, 42
BIOSCIENCE 750, 757 (Nov. 1992).
207. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 10 (between 2.7 and 96.25 birds are killed per mile of road
per year, with an estimated median value of 15.1, on 3,786,713 miles of road in 1972); Federal
Highway Administration, Office of Highway Policy Administration, 1996 Highway Statistics
(revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/l996/section5.html> (Tables HM- 10, 12
and 20 state that there were 3,933,985 miles of road in 1996, and Table VM-I states that there were
210,236,393 registered vehicles with an average of 11,807 miles per year driven by each vehicle).
The calculation assumes that the incidence of bird strikes and kills by cars was the same in 1996 as
Banks found in 1972.
More recently, Al Manville has received anecdotal reports of thousands of Cedar
Waxwings killed in the East and Northeast, purportedly because of an attraction to fruiting exotic
plants (e.g., Autumn olive) planted on highway median strips. Interviews with Albert M. Manville II,
Ph.D, Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird Office (Dec. 21, 1999, Jan. 21, 2000).
208. W.R. Evans and A.M. Manville II (eds.), 2000, Avian Mortality at Communications
Towers, Transcripts of Proceedings of the Workshop on Avian Mortality at Communication Towers,
August 11, 1999, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issues/towers/agenda.html>. See also USA Towerkill Summary
(revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.towerkill.com/issues/consum.html> ("it is not hard to imagine
that annual bird mortality at communications towers could be over five million birds a year," but the
scarcity of long-term studies, the total absence of studies at shorter towers, and scavengers removing
kills before discovery means "the annual mortality could be much larger").
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Oil spills and other industrial accidents: variable. Taking the Exxon
Valdez oil spill as an example, more than 36,000 birds representing at
least 90 species were retrieved and stored in the morgue in Valdez fol-
lowing the spill."' Retrieved specimens probably represented only 10 to
30 percent of the actual bird mortality," ' meaning a total of 120,000 to
360,000 were killed.22 Richard Banks estimated, in 1972, that such
"large" spills occur only semi-annually, and result in only tens of thou-
sands of birds killed, but that oil sumps or waste pits kill an estimated
1.5 million birds per year."'
Fishing bycatch: hundreds of thousands of seabirds are conservatively
estimated to die each year by drowning, strangulation, or injury from
fishing hooks and longlines."' Illegal use of gill nets adds to the toll."'
Members of 61 different bird species have been killed, of which 25
species (41 percent) have been classified as "threatened" by the World
Conservation Union.' Some species will not survive if the situation
continues, e.g., the Southern Albatross."' "Governments, non-
governmental organizations, and commercial fishery associations are
petitioning for measures to reduce the mortality of seabirds in longline
fisheries in which seabirds are incidentally taken ....
209. Interview with Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird
Office (Dec. 21, 1999).
210. Albert M. Manville, II, Cleaning Up an Oil Spill: Some Biological Tools in the Chest of
Cleanup Options, I J. CLEAN TECH. AND ENVTL. SCI. 123, 124 (1991) (in September 1989 alone,
FWS retrieved 36,470 dead birds representing 90 species).
211. John F. Piatt et al., Immediate Impact of the "Exxon Valdez" Oil Spill on Marine Birds,
107 THE AUK 387, 395 (Apr. 1990).
212. See id. (estimating total Exxon Valdez bird kill at 100,000 to 300,000, and that it would
have been greater if it had occurred in summer or autumn); Manville, supra note 210, at 124-25
(subsequent government studies indicated that 350,000 to 390,000 birds died and Manville believed
the cumulative total would exceed 500,000.).
213. BANKS, supra note 8, at 12.
214. Interview with Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird
Office, (Feb. 10, 2000) (referencing Constituent Briefing). A single commercial longliner may
deploy as many as 35,000 hooks each day. NIGEL P. BROTHERS ETAL., THE INCIDENTAL CATCH OF
SEABIRDS BY LONGLINE FISHERIES: WORLDWIDE REVIEW AND TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR
MITIGATION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, FISHERIES CIRCULAR, No. 937, 1, 1 (1999).
Note that the estimated bird loses due to fishing bycatch are global, unlike the losses from other
causes listed in the text which are in the United States.
215. Manville, supra note 214.
216. Manville, supra note 214.
217. Manville, supra note 214; BROTHERS ETAL., supra note 214, at 26 ("Based on evidence to
hand ... populations of several species of albatrosses, giant petrels and Whitechinned Petrels, were
not sustainable .... ).
218. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FOA), Fisheries Department, The
International Plan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries,
Introduction, paragraph I, republished in, National Marine Fisheries Service, Draft National Plan of
Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, Appendix I (revisited
Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/protectedresources/draftnpa.htm>. See also 64 Fed.Reg.
73017 (Dec. 29, 1999) (announcing availability of National Plan of Action and inviting comments).
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Electrocutions"' and power line impacts: thousands to tens of thousands
per year.' The electric power industry has been aware, for over a cen-
tury, of the danger posed to birds by its power lines and, for the last 25
years, has promulgated voluminous suggested practices to minimize
bird fatalities.
Wind generator impacts: several thousand per year22 but the potential
for more kills increases as the industry grows.2 '
The Federal Aviation Administration and the National
Wildlife Research Center have documented an average of
over 2500 bird strikes by civilian aircraft each year in the
United States and estimate that the actual number is five
219. Bird electrocutions occur on electric distribution lines that carry 34,500 volts or less, and
not on larger transmission towers, because wires are close enough to each other or to conductors for
the birds to short circuit the lines. See Williams, supra note 201, at 32, 34. There are presently
116,532, 289 distribution poles in the United States. See id. at 36. The introduction of steel poles in
place of present wooden poles is expected to aggravate the problem. See id. at 38.
Power distribution poles are not the only cause of bird electrocutions. For example,
California installed high-voltage fences around its prisons to reduce staffing costs but, as a result,
executed more than 3000 birds in the first five years. See Jack Fischer, Prison Fence Nets Ensure No
Birds Are Erecuted, San Jose Mercury News, April 8, 1998, at IA, available through
<http://www.newslibrary.com>. California officials had not considered the impact of the fences on
birds. Pursuant to an agreement with FWS, California agreed to protect the fences and the birds with
netting. See id The nets were described as 90 percent effective. See id. Although the nets would cost
$3.4 million, the fences were estimated to save California $40 million annually in staff salaries. See
id.
220. Briefing Statement by A.M. Manville II, Jan. 10, 2000 (file name
WPFILES:birddeat.bri.wpd) (on file with author). See also John L. Trapp, Bird Kills at Towers And
Other Human-Made Structures: An Annotated Partial Bibliography (1960-1998) (revisited Feb. 14,
2001) <http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issuestower.html>.
221. See R.R. Olendorff et al., SUGGESTED PRACTICES FOR RAPTOR PROTECTION ON POWER
LINES: THE STATE OF THE ART IN 1996, AVIAN POWER LINE INTERACTION COMM. AND EDISON
ELEC. INST., 1 (1996) (citing investigations of electrocution of eagles in 1970s and subsequently,
"[olver the last 25 years, those efforts have led to a detailed understanding of the biological factors
that attract raptors to power lines, and those harmful interactions that lead to electrocution."); W.M.
Brown et al., MITIGATING BIRD COLLISIONS WITH POWER LINES: THE STATE OF THE ART IN 1994,
AVIAN POWER LINE INTERACTION COMM. AND EDISON ELECTRIC INST., at 1 (1994) (describing
studies of dead birds under telegraph wires as early as 1876, and birds killed by impacts with power
lines as early as 1904).
222. Interview with Albert M. Manville, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird
Office (Feb. 23, 2000) (extrapolation based, in part, on NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY
LABORATORY, A PILOT GOLDEN EAGLE POPULATION STUDY IN THE ALTAMONT PASS WIND
RESOURCE AREA, CALIFORNIA, NREI/TP-441-7821, U.S. DEPT. ENERGY (1995)). See also Lisa
Vonderbrueggen, Agencies Say Windmill Firms Should Pay for Bird Habitat Protection, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, (from 1992 through January of 1998, 1,025 birds were killed at
Altamont Pass by windmill blades or electrocution; proposal to replace existing wind generators
with 85 percent fewer generators of a more efficient and bird friendly design).
223. Briefing Statement, supra note 220. See also Enron Agrees to Move LA Windmills Away
From Condors' Flight Path, SEAtTLE-DAILY J. COM., Nov. 5, 1999 (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.djc.comnews/enviro/l0060302.html> (in response to National Audubon Society
objections that 200 foot high windmills threatened the 49 remaining wild condors, Enron dropped
plans to build 53 windmills north of Los Angeles in exchange for a lease on land about 20 miles
away).
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times greater, Le., over 12,500 per year.2 Some impacts
involve many birds.' In addition, the Air Force reports its
aircraft average an additional 2,600 birds strikes each
year.'
Communication towers have been an especially foreseeable problem,
having first been documented in the late 1940s.' Bird kills at light-
houses had been noted for centuries and bird kills at tall television tow-
ers began to be documented as soon as they began to be constructed in
the 1940s.' In the 1970s, the FWS estimated bird kills at communica-
tions towers to be 1.4 million per year based on the 1,100 towers then
in existence. -  Today, with nearly 49,000 towers taller than 200 feet,
scientists estimate that more than 4 million birds die in impacts with
communications towers in North America .2" The industry estimates that
224. NWRC-Ohio Field Station, FAA Wildlife Strikes to Civil Aircraft in the United States
(revisited Feb 14, 2001) <http://www.lrbcg.connwrcsandusky/strike.html>. See also Edward C.
Cleary et al., Wildlife Strikes to Civil Aircraft in the United States 1991-1997. FAA Wildl. Aircraft
Strike Database Ser. Rep. 4 (Sept. 1998), at 1-3 (2,421 strikes/year) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.faa.gov/arp/pdf/strkrpt.pdf>.
225. See, e.g., Transport Canada Transport, Near-Crashes (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/aerodrme/wildlife/d/d3.htrn>.
Transport Canada has documented over 100 fatal airplane crashes caused by impacts with
aircraft and other crashes for which bird strikes are suspected. See Aircraft Crashes and Loss of Life
(revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.tc.gc.cafaviation/aerodrme/birdstke/wildlife/ d/d2.htm>.
Obviously, there are many other bird strikes fatal only to the birds.
226. See Tamar A. Mehuron, Bird Strike!., 81 AIR FORCE MAG. 6 (June 1998) (revisited Feb.
14, 2001) <http://www.afa.org/magazine/chart/0698chart.html>.
227. See Towerkill.com, Brief Historical Overview (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.towerkill.com/issues/intro.html>. See also Trapp, supra note 220.
228. Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., The ABC's of Avoiding Bird Collisions At Communication
Towers: The Next Steps, Introduction, presented at the Electric Research Institute's Avian
Interactions Workshop, Dec. 2, 1999, Charleston, S.C, (currently in press) published on the intemet
at (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issues/towers/abcs.html>; Towerkill.com,
Brief Historical Overview (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.towerkill.com/issues/intro.html>.
229. Chris Tolleson, Service To Host Workshop On Fatal Bird Collisions With
Communications Towers, FWS August 2, 1999 News Release announcing August 11, 1999
Workshop at Cornell University (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.fws.gov/r9extaff/pr995 I.html>. See also BANKS, supra note 8, at 10, I1 (stating that
three studies between 1967 and 1973 found estimated annual mortalities per tower between 2,121
and 2,843; the author rounded the number to 2,500 but assumed only one-half of the towers resulted
in bird kills). One million, four hundred thousand bird deaths from 1,100 towers per year works out
to a mortality rate of 1,273 bird deaths for each tower each year.
230. FWS August 2, 1999 News Release announcing August I1, 1999 Workshop at Cornell
University (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fws.gov/r9extaff/pr9951.html>. See also
discussion supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text (estimating birds killed by impacts with
communications towers); Towerkill.com, USA Towerkill Summary (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.towerkill.com/issues/consum.html> (Federal Aviation Administration Digital Obstacle
File lists 39,530 towers over 200 feet but some towers close together get counted as one). Four
million bird deaths from 49,100 towers per year works out to a mortality rate of 82 bird deaths for
each tower each year. Compare with supra note 201 (probability of bird death or injury in Moon
Lake was only 0.0064 per pole per year).
It is unknown whether linear extrapolation of mortality figures is appropriate. Dr. Charles
Kemper speculates that a recently documented drop in bird mortality at towers may be due to the
dispersal of a fixed population of birds among a greater number of towers. See Wendy K. Weisensel,
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
there will be as many as 100,000 new towers in the next decade. Be-
cause of Federal Communication Commission mandates to digitalize
all television stations by 2003, at least 1,000 of the new towers will be
over 1000 feet high."' Taller towers create a greater threat to birds be-
cause they require more lights and guy wires, increasing the probability
of fatal bird impacts.232 Federal Aviation Administration requirements
for red pilot warning lights on all towers taller than 200 feet increase
the risk because red pulsating lights attract birds more than do white
stobes. '"
Of growing concern are not only the impacts of individual mortality factors
on birds (e.g., tower collisions), but the combined or cumulative impacts of all
mortality factors on bird populations. Currently, more than 200 species of mi-
gratory birds (of our 836) are in trouble, 90 listed under ESA (75 endangered, 15
threatened), and 124 on the Service's [FWS] list of non-game species of man-
agement concern. Some populations are declining precipitously."
B. Avoidable
In addition to being foreseeable, migratory bird deaths caused by impacts
with human constructions, and other "unintended" causes of bird deaths, are
avoidable.
Cat predation on birds can be reduced by keeping cats indoors." Even when
cats must be allowed outdoors as, for example, on farms to control rodents, the
cats can be kept neutered and well fed, bird feeders and other bird attractions
can be kept away, food sources for strays can be eliminated, and unwanted cats
can be disposed of, rather than being released. 3'
Numerous measures are available to reduce or virtually eliminate bird
strikes against windows, including: interior covering with translucent material;
23 7
removal of attractants such as feeders, watering areas, and nutritious and aes-
thetic vegetation in front of windows;23' placing netting in front of windows;39
Battered by the Airwaves?, Wis. NAT. RESOURCES MAG. (February 2000) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.wnrmag.con/stories/2000/feb00/birdtower.htm>. On the other hand, Dr. Kemper
observes that scavenging by predators is an alternative explanation for the absence of bird carcasses
at towers. See id.
231. FWS August 2, 1999 News Release, supra note 229.
232. Id. See also USA Towerkill Summary, supra note 230.
233. FWS August 2, 1999 News Release. supra note 229.
234. Briefing Statement (by A.M. Manville), supra note 220.
235. See, e.g., Coleman, Cats and Wildlife, supra note 203 (section titled "What you can do").
236. See Coleman, Cats and Wildlife, supra note 203 (section titled "What you can do").
237. See Klem, Collisions, supra note 204, at 123. Although not discussed in the literature, one
might expect tinted glass to protect birds by making the glass visible.
238. See Klein, Collisions, supra note 204, at 126; Alternatively, Klem suggests placing
attractants within one foot of windows because birds are drawn first to the attractant and, when
taking flight, have not built up sufficient momentum to sustain serious injury. See Klein, Collisions,
supra note 204, Dunn, on the other hand, prefers moving attractants far from windows. See Dunn,
supra note 204, at 309.
239. See Dunn, supra note 204, at 309 ("installation of plastic garden-protection netting about
25 cm from the window essentially solved ... severe window-strike problems .... The mesh did not
block views substantially.").
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placement of vertical strips in front of windows;2" and installation of windows at
an angle to reflect solid objects, such as the ground, instead of surrounding
habitat or sky." These solutions and others are being promoted by the Canadian
based Fatal Light Awareness Program (FLAP), ' which is being actively pro-
moted by the National Audubon Society, Cats Indoors!, and the American Bird
Conservancy.3
Bird impacts with towers can be reduced by co-locating equipment on ex-
isting facilities, building towers without guy wires, and eliminating lighting or
using lighting less attractive to birds.2" Even a layperson can read the reports of
bird strikes with communications towers and identify possible ways to reduce
the carnage..2 ' Elimination of guy wires and adjustment of lighting are obvious
solutions.
Numerous measures have been suggested to reduce longline bycatch of sea-
birds in fisheries, including both technical measures (increase sink rate of bait,
thaw bait, and use of line-setting machine, bait casting machine, below-water
setting chute or funnel, bird-scaring devices, water cannon) and operational
measures (reduce visibility of bait by night setting, reduce attractiveness of ves-
sels to seabirds, and area and seasonal closures).' One can reasonably anticipate
additional solutions as international efforts continue."7
240. See Klem Collisions, supra note 204, at 126.
241. See Klem Collisions, supra note 204, at 127.
242. FLAP, How To Make Your Home, Cottage & School Safe For Birds (revisited Feb. 14,
2001) <http://www.flap.org/how2.htm> (offering the suggestions to hang ribbons, hang silhouettes
so they move, etch images onto exterior glass, use spider web decals). See also Weisenel, sidebar
titled "Prevent bird collisions at home, "supra note 230.
243. See Audubon, Cats Indoors! (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.audubon.org/
bird/cat/>.
244. Tolleson, supra note 229 (quoting Albert M. Manville, Ph.D.). See also Weisensel, supra
note 230 (section titled "Changing lights, heights and designs to make towers less of an attraction").
Certainly, collisions of birds with tall, lighted buildings is of the greatest concern,
with single buildings (e.g. skyscrapers) sometimes accounting for hundreds or
thousands of bird mortalities/year.) Two different types of problems - birds in
daylight disoriented by reflections of plate glass windows, nocturnal migrants
disoriented by interior or exterior lighting of tall buildings, especially in foul
weather; both result in collision with windows or building and death due to blunt
trauma. Both types of mortality can be prevented or minimized.
Email communication from John Trapp, FWS, (Dec. 28, 1999) (on file with author). See also
Towerkill.com, Towerkill Mechanisms (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.towerkill.com/
issues/mech.html>; Paul Kerlinger, Ph.D., Avian Mortality At Communication Towers: A Review of
Recent Literature, Research and Methodology, March 2000, published on the internet at (visited
Feb. 14, 2001) <http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issues/tblcont.html>.
245. See, e.g., The Topeka Capital Journal, Thousands of Birds Fly To Their Deaths Around
Radio Towers (Jan. 30, 1998) <http:/www.cjonline.com/stories/013098/kan birds.html> (reporting
death of between 5,000 and 10,000 Lapland longspurs from crashing into guy wires, obscured in fog
and snow, after being drawn by bright lights around radio transmission tower near Syracuse, Kansas
on January 22, 1998).
246. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FOA), Fisheries Department, The
International Plan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries,
Technical note on some optional technical and operational measures for reducing the incidential
catch of seabirds, Section II (Technical measures), republished in, National Marine Fisheries
Service, Draft National Plan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline
Fisheries, Appendix VI (Future Conferences and Events Related to Seabird-Fishery Interactions)
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The Moon Lake decision was premised on the fact that the bird deaths could
have been avoided. In 1996 the electric power industry said: "[E]lectrocution at
power facilities remains a legitimate concern. Such mortalities can be addressed
by a variety of mitigation measures, through design and retrofitting of existing
lines.' ' 8 The industry produced a 125 page publication of specific recommenda-
tions for siting of power lines and design of power poles to minimize the risk of
electrocution to raptors, a migratory bird. 9 The industry also published a 78
page report containing detailed instructions to reduce deaths caused by migra-
tory bird impacts.
1
Existing windmills can be and are being replaced by more efficient and bird-
friendly designs.2 ' Bird strikes on highways can also often be prevented by ad-
justments in siting of the roads and bird attractions such as crossing, feeding and
nesting sites."'
Finally, the causes and frequency of bird strikes with aircraft have been
plotted and bird avoidance procedures developed. -
(visited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/protectedresources/draftnpa.html>. See also 64
Fed.Reg. 73017 (Dec. 29, 1999) (announcing availability of National Plan of Action and inviting
comments). For a technical note on some optional technical and operational measures for reducing
the incidental take of seabirds, see Brothers, supra note 214, at 44-84.
247. A series of international meetings were scheduled. United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FOA), Fisheries Department, The International Plan of Action for Reducing
Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, Introduction, paragraph 1, republished in,
National Marine Fisheries Service, Draft National Plan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental
Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, Appendix I
<http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/protectedresources/drafinpa.htm> (listing Wilhelmshaven, Germany on
March 17-19, 2000; Darmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada in April 2000; Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, May 8-
12, 2000).
248. R.R. OLENDORFF, supra note 221, at 6 (emphasis added).
249. See R.R. OLENDORFF, supra note 221.
250. See W.M. BROWN ET AL., supra note 221.
251. Vonderbrueggen, supra note 222 (bird friendly wind turbines have larger but slower
turning blades, are placed on taller towers above the birds' hunting patterns, and have perching spots
eliminated).
252. BANKS, supra note 8, at 9 (citing English studies showing "black spots" of high mortality
associated with open gates, breaks in hedges or walls, and proximity of feeding and resting sites; and
a Texas study showing one-third of all road deaths occurred between daybreak and 8 a.m.).
253. Transport Canada, Aircraft Crashes And Loss Of Life (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/aerodrme/birdstke/wildlife/d/d2.htm>; Near Crashes, id., at
<...d/d3.htm>; Species Involved, id. at <...d/dl4.htm> (noting, among other facts, that birds of prey
may attack aircraft while waterfowl generally avoid aircraft); see also Air Force News, Whiteman
Reduces Bird Strike Hazard (Nov. 18, 1997) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.af.mil/news/Novl997/n19971118_971462.html> (reporting successful efforts at
Whiteman Air Force Base to avoid bird strikes between B-2 bombers and a flock of 125,000
Redwing Blackbirds); FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, Ch. 7, Sect. 4-2 (Reducing Bird
Strike Risks) (Jan. 25, 2001) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.faa.gov/ATPubs/AIM>;
Mehuron, supra note 226 (describing use of falcons to drive off large flocks and of remote-
controlled model aircraft broadcasting bird of prey sounds to drive off big birds).
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VIII. THE NEED FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION
Court opinions have suggested that a distinction may exist between hunting
and non-hunting human-caused bird deaths based on foreseeability, avoidability
and the presence or absence of a volitional act or omission. Objective data indi-
cates that the distinction does not exist and, especially, the distinction does not
exist between non-hunting deaths for which courts have recognized MBTA
criminal liability (e.g., pollution, pesticides, and electrocution) and those for
which courts have expressed reservations (e.g., automobiles, airplanes, towers,
and windows)." Consequently, an intellectually honest, and reasonably objec-
tive basis for distinguishing appurtenances of modem society cannot be found in
any of the defenses and theories of criminal law commonly put forward as po-
tential limitations on strict criminal liability, i.e., a basis for distinction cannot be
found in theories of proximate causation, impossibility, good faith or due care,
etc. In addition, the efforts of the courts to fashion such a limitation is an un-
democratic interference in the processes of representative government.
If the solution is not to be found in theories or defenses put forward by the
courts, where is it to be found?"' Three examples illustrate a range of democratic
options.
One option is for FWS (the Secretary of the Interior to be precise) to issue
regulations pursuant to the notice and comment, or alternative requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act,"' just as the Secretary now authorizes killing
of migratory birds. 5' By regulation, FWS may, with the collaboration of the
254. One reason courts may discount bird deaths caused by impacts is that the deaths are
usually infrequent and few at any single location. Brothers, et al., addressed this perceptual problem
in the context of seabird bycatch by longline fishing.
Prior to 1988 . . . [flishers had no concept (and many still do not) of bird
populations and the consequences of catching a few individuals. After all, each
fishing vessel may catch only one or two birds a day, sometimes none for many
days and each day the impression is of just as many birds flying around the ship.
It is understandable that fishers had no perception of a problem. Further, they
have little understanding of the population biology of seabirds and why their
practice threatens the survival of albatrosses. Concepts such as delayed maturity,
year-long breeding cycles, biennial breeding and long life spans were not known.
BROTHERS, ETAL, supra note 214, at 46.
255, Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 192, suggest criteria for strict criminal liability that
build on and go beyond the decided cases: an act must (1) be purposeful (though not necessarily the
consequences), (2) involve potentially lethal agents (poisons, chain saws, guns, power lines, fire,
etc.), (3) involve some degree of "culpability," and (4) be a reasonably foreseeable cause of bird
mortality in the event the operation goes astray, whether by negligence or by accident. The proposed
criteria do not contribute to a solution. The element of "culpability" is undefined and makes the
criteria rather circular. The other elements seem redundant.
256. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (Administrative Procedure Act); 5 U.S.C.
§§ 561-570 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (negotiated rulemaking procedure); 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998) (alternative means of dispute resolution in the administrative process).
257. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 704(c), 712 (Supp. 2000) (authorizing Secretary of the Interior to issue
implementing regulations). The court in Moon Lake acknowledged the need for reasonable
regulations. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1085 (D.
Colo. 1999) ("Reasonable regulation by the Secretary, in conjunction with proper application of the
law, which includes requiring the prosecution to prove proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt
under § 702(a), can effectively avoid absurd and unintended results."). But see Alaska Fish &
Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 940-41 (9th Cir, 1987) (stating that
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affected public, define and distinguish those migratory bird deaths that are an
unavoidable consequence of the instrumentalities of our modem society, 8 and
those that are both foreseeable and reasonably avoidable. Similarly, permits can
be obtained for many situations not anticipated in the regulations. 2 9 In the course
of applying for such a permit a dialog can also take place. The reasonableness of
any regulation or permit may be reviewed by the courts.26 If there were such a
regulatory scheme in place, anyone who chose to ignore the lawful regulatory
alternatives would act at his or her own peril.
A second, more focused approach is discussion and negotiation with indi-
vidual industries. As discussed in the preceding Part,"' the electric power indus-
try has been studying the problem and producing recommended practices in
cooperation with FWS for over 25 years. Prosecution arose because Moon Lake
chose not to use technology readily available to minimize bird deaths. Following
the Moon Lake decision, the defendant entered a plea of guilty. As part of the
plea agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed that
obligated Moon Lake to develop and implement an "Avian-Protection Plan" to
protect raptors from electrocution and to report and collect birds that might be
electrocuted either during the Plan's implementation or notwithstanding the best
efforts of the Plan.26- The MOU states that so long as Moon Lake is in compli-
ance with the agreement, neither it nor its officers or employees will be subject
to administrative, civil, or criminal prosecution for migratory bird deaths ("un-
lawful takings of avian species") that may occur.2" The Moon Lake MOU is
regulations must comport with the most restrictive provisions of the migratory bird conventions).
Because the Canadian convention does not allow taking of game birds during closed seasons nor of
insectivorous birds at any time, one might argue no permits can be issued for "incidental takings"
caused by human constructions.
258. That the instrumentalities are necessary to modem society is implicit in the regulations of
the FCC and FAA which necessitate tall towers with lights that attract birds. See supra notes 231-
233 and accompanying text. The primary issue is not whether the instrumentalities are necessary, nor
whether bird fatalities are foreseeable. Rather, the issue is the extent to which bird fatalities are
avoidable and how many can be saved.
259. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2000) (Special Purpose Permits, usually for actions benefiting the
species or research). Although permits can, arguably, be issued for situations not otherwise
anticipated in migratory bird regulations, FWS does not issue permits for bird strike fatalities,
relying instead on cooperation and discretionary enforcement. Interview with Susan Lawrence,
FWS, (Jan. 24, 2000). See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has
recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's
absolute discretion.").
260. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994) (judicial review of agency decisions). One hurdle that a
regulatory solution must overcome is the Ninth Circuit decision in Dunkle. See sources and text cited
supra note 257 (describing Dunkle).
261. See discussion supra Part VII.A (Foreseeable bird deaths) and, especially, notes 219-221
and accompanying text.
262. August 16, 1999 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Sections III and IV. The MOU
also contains provisions relating to nests (Section V) and record-keeping (Section VI). In addition to
monitoring compliance, record-keeping could be used for scientific purposes. See Klem, supra note
204, at 127 (describing recovered window-kills as a "valuable but largely neglected ornithological
resource" for anatomical and plumage studies, and for study of geographic distributions and
migration routes).
263. MOU at Section IV.A.2.
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analogous to a permit although, strictly speaking, it is an exercise of agency
enforcement discretion.
Similarly, for communication towers, the FWS is exploring with industry
methods to reduce migratory bird deaths.' Although in early stages, the FWS
anticipates a process of informal discussions, possible research into the problem
and mitigating measures, and guidance memoranda." Canada, which also ad-
ministers the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1918, is also exploring solutions to "inci-
dental" migratory bird deaths, perhaps analogous to Endangered Species Act
Habitat Conservation Plans.'
A third alternative is for Congress to amend the MBTA. Ultimately, Con-
gress may find it necessary to step in with statutory distinctions among different
means of human-caused bird deaths, just as it did when it added requirements of
knowledge to the MBTA baiting provisions. However, for now it has not, per-
haps in recognition of the intensely technical nature of the issues and of the rea-
sonableness of the present collaborative processes employed by FWS, which
assure a thorough exchange of information and encourage full exploration of
and experimentation in what is technically possible with still evolving technol-
ogy.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The uneasiness that courts and commentators have expressed with strict
criminal liability generally is reasonable but courts often fail to distinguish the
individual cases and crimes swept up in the single term. A different matter are
the anticipatory concerns for MBTA enforcement against some forms of non-
hunting, human-caused bird deaths, specifically, impacts with human construc-
tions. There is substantial evidence of a serious threat to migratory birds which
could be reduced by intelligent design, if only the affected industries would
undertake to examine the problem and identify solutions.267
A substantial portion, perhaps the majority of all migratory bird deaths
caused by people are caused by impacts with human constructions. Although a
number of courts have expressed reservations about applying the MBTA to bird
deaths resulting from impacts with human constructions, none of the courts has
articulated any factual distinctions between deaths caused by impacts and deaths
caused by pesticides, pollution, or electrocution. Court's conclusory statements
that impact deaths are not foreseeable or proximately caused are inconsistent
with available data.
Data demonstrate that migratory bird deaths caused by impacts are many
times more common, foreseeable, and avoidable than are deaths caused by pes-
ticides, pollution, or electrocution, each of which causes of bird deaths courts
264. See, e.g., Tolleson, supra note 229; Avian Mortality at Communications Towers, Brochure
announcing August 11, 1999 Workshop at Cornell University as part of the 117th Meeting of the
American Ornithological Union <http://www.fws.gov/r9mbmo/aoubrochure.html>.
265. Interview with Jon Andrew, Chief, FWS Office of Migratory Bird Management (Dec. 17,
1999).
266. Interview with Steve Wendt, Canadian Wildlife Service (Nov. 9, 1999).
267. See discussion supra Part VII (Bird Deaths Caused by Instrumentalities of Modem
Civilization Are Foreseeable and Avoidable).
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have accepted as creating MBTA liability. Consequently, the theories put for-
ward to limit strict criminal liability are inapplicable because the mistaken
premise of each is that the resulting deaths were unforeseeable, unavoidable, or
both. Furthermore, the theories put forward to limit strict criminal liability are
inherently policy judgments which, in a democratic society, are properly made
by the elected branches of government.
Administrative authorities are presently engaged in cooperative efforts to
minimize migratory bird deaths caused by impacts with human constructions.
Those efforts depend upon the sanction of criminal enforcement for those who
refuse to prevent avoidable bird deaths.
That those responsible for migratory bird deaths may chose to ignore the
problem is not a reasonable ground for courts to fashion theories or defenses that
might bar prosecutions. That every last bird death may not be avoidable is not a
reasonable ground to excuse a failure to reduce the number of avoidable bird
deaths. Courts should have no reservations upholding MBTA strict criminal
liability for traumatic migratory bird deaths which data shows are foreseeable
and avoidable.
